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The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation – 
Enforcement and Compliance in Professional 
Services 
 
BY PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS* 
 
Abstract 
 
The increased expansion of economic activity beyond national 
borders leads to a shift of regulatory power.  Public authorities concede 
power, explicitly or tacitly, to private bodies, whereas the multilayered 
ecology of global governance inevitably increases the role of 
transnational institutional structures. This article examines such 
developments in the area of professional services.  It starts by analyzing 
the self-regulation phenomenon in professional services and points to 
examples where professional associations accentuate their unique nature 
to justify the importance of nonintervention in their internal affairs.  
Powerful professional associations have been thereby created, which, 
depending on the services subsector (e.g. legal, engineering or 
advertising services), are the final masters of access to and practice of a 
given profession.  After a critical review of the most important 
professional associations at the global level, the article focuses on 
instances of private enforcement and goes on to examine the role of 
courts in reviewing such enforcement.  In this regard, constitutionality 
of private enforcement is also examined.  Finally, the article refers to 
the role of antitrust rules in harnessing distortive business practices that 
professional associations may adopt.  The article focuses in particular 
on instances of private, decentralized enforcement.  Whereas no truly 
transnational private regulation in professional services has yet 
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emerged, it is submitted that the foundations for such a development are 
being built progressively as a result of borderless activities in this sector 
and a relatively deferential stance on the side of the State. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court had to decide on 
whether pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets necessary to hire 
legal counsel of choice violated the Sixth Amendment.1  The Supreme 
Court answered in the affirmative.  This judgment is important for various 
reasons.  For our purposes, it is significant because, after many decades of 
judicial interpretations about several aspects of legal services, it confirmed 
the hybrid nature of legal services pending between the private interests of 
economic actors, such as those of lawyers, on one side, and the public 
interest that lawyers are still called upon to defend today.  
The public nature of the legal profession is exemplified more 
eloquently in the objective of the smooth administration of justice. Indeed, 
as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Gideon,2 the respect of the right to 
be heard is inextricably associated with the right of choosing the ‘guiding 
hand’ of legal counsel.  This fundamental right to counsel3 epitomizes the 
distinguished role of lawyers as facilitators of the need for respecting 
constitutional rights and due process in virtually all legal traditions.4  
The hybrid nature of legal activity means that courts will acknowledge 
the economic character of lawyers’ activities and will occasionally find that 
the public character of their functioning does not exempt them from the 
application of obligations that other trades, businesses, or professions must 
abide by.  For instance, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
has recently found that the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
applies to legal services – in this case, a contract between a lawyer and a 
client-consumer relating to legal fees.5 Such obligations would apply in 
addition to the obligations of independence, confidentiality and ethical 
requirements. The fact that an asymmetry of information and technical 
 
 1. See Luis v United States, 578 U. S. __ (2016), judgment of March 30, 2016. 
 2. See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). 
 3. See Grosjean v American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 243, 244 (1936). 
 4. Recently, the Court accepted that under certain rare and exceptional circumstances, 
attorney fees may increase based on the so-called “lodestar approach”, again recognizing the 
importance of adequately compensating attorneys who facilitate the administration of justice and 
sometimes substitute for the deficiencies of the public prosecution system. See US Supreme 
Court, Perdue v Kenny A., 559 U. S. 542 (2010). 
 5. See Case C-537/13, Birutė Šiba v Arūnas Devėnas, 2015 E.C.R., [hereafter Birutė Šiba] 
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knowledge exists by nature in this bilateral relationship weighed heavily in 
the decision of the court.6  
Similar judgments that attempt to draw a balance between the public 
and the private nature of professionals abound.  Globalization of economic 
activity raises new questions and concerns, notably because the activity of 
professionals may not be subject to domestic regulations due to the lack of 
jurisdiction.  As the issue of jurisdiction becomes blurred, private regulation 
developed by transnational professional bodies is growing in prominence.  The 
legal profession has only been part of a more general trend that clearly 
surfaces in professional services.7 
The objective of this article is to map the landscape of transnational 
self-regulation in professional services and critically review instances (and 
potential problems) of enforcement, be it private, public or hybrid.  
Transnational self-regulation in professional services examines the 
emerging body of rules created by private actors that are active beyond 
national borders and attempts to manage ex ante potential challenges that the 
global nature of economic activity brings about.  Increased globalization of 
economic activity leads to a shift of regulatory power from public to private 
and from national to global.  Driven by the forces of globalization of business, 
these private actors aim to offer handy solutions to global professionals 
through rule-making activities that take place “in the shadow of the law” and 
the traditional forms of State regulatory making.8  
Inevitably, the issue of legitimacy of such actors emerges.9  Domestic 
self-regulated professional associations typically draw their legitimacy by 
an act transferring powers from public bodies to such associations.  
However, transnational professional associations claim legitimacy through the 
participation of domestic private bodies in such associations.  This “derived 
legitimacy” can be highly problematic, notably in regards to enforcement.  
At the outset, it appears opportune to delineate the services sectors 
that we will focus on.  According to the sectoral classification list (W/120) 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)10 of the World 
 
 6. See also, Case C-94/04, Cipolla, 2006 E.C.R. I-11421. 
 7. For an early account, see Detlev Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need for 
More Governance?, 90:2 AM. J. INT’L L. 250 (1996). 
 8. For an economic perspective on alternative modes of governance, see the treatise by 
AVINASH DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS – ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE (2004). 
 9. See Richard Stewart, Enforcement of Transnational Public Regulation, in ENFORCEMENT 
OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION – ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD 41, 44 (Fabrizio 
Cafaggi, ed., 2012). 
 10. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), Annex 1B, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
(1994), as reported in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
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Trade Organization (WTO),11 professional services do not form an 
independent services sector, but are classified as a subsector of business 
services.12 This classification contains 11 broad services sectors and one 
residual category of “other services.”  These sectors are further divided into 
sub-sectors and sub-subsectors.  The W/120 follows the structure of the 
more detailed provisional Central Product Classification (CPC) system 
agreed upon within the United Nations.13  Professional services within the 
meaning of the GATS are considered to include a wide array of professions 
such as accounting, law, architecture, advertising, architecture, engineering, 
management consulting or market research.14  
This article focuses on the regulation and enforcement of transnational 
private regulation in legal, architectural and engineering services.  After a 
review of recent trends in business and professional services in Section II, 
Section III discusses the rationale behind the regulation of professional 
services as well as its peculiarities.  An analysis of the transnational 
dimension of legal, engineering and architectural services, including the 
relevant actors and processes, follows in Section IV.  The interaction 
between private enforcement and judicial review is discussed in Section V, 
whereas Section VI tackles the possibility of invoking constitutional claims 
that can be raised against restrictive self-regulatory practices.  Section VII 
critically reviews the existing case law relating to the role of antitrust-
related claims to trump private regulation and enforcement practices by 
professional associations.  Section VIII concludes.  
 
II. The Importance of Professional Services – Recent Trends 
 
Global trade in services has grown in the last 20 years in a steadier 
manner than merchandise trade.  Importantly, services have been more resilient 
than goods to the macroeconomic upheaval of recent times.  Trade in services 
suffered significantly only in 2009, decreasing almost 10 percent.  However, in 
 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999) [hereinafter GATS]. 
 11. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement or WTO 
Agreement]. 
 12. GATS, supra at note 10, “Services Sectoral Classification List,” MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 
July 1991. The GATS is the first and only international agreement regulating trade in services, 
agreed on as an Annex to the World Trade Organization Agreement entered into force in 1995.  
 13. United Nations Statistical Papers, Provisional Central Product Classification, Series M 
No. 77, (1991). The United Nations Statistics Division currently uses the CPC Version 2.1.  
 14. See GATS, supra at note 10, “Trade in Professional Services,” Note by the Secretariat, 
MTN.GNS/W/67, (1989). 
2017] The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation 5 
2010, it resumed its precrisis levels, whereas global services exports grew by 
five percent in 2014.  On average, trade in services has still increased by 
eight percent annually in the last two decades.  Exports of commercial 
services by WTO Members totalled US$4.87 trillion in 2014, about a fifth 
of global trade.  Having said this, such statistics routinely underestimate the 
value of services trade, as they fail to capture investment flows by foreign 
affiliates in an accurate way.  For instance, in terms of value added, 
services are regarded as accounting for 40 percent of total trade.15 
Services account for most of US and world economic output.  An 
average of over 70 percent of GDP and jobs in the OECD countries are due 
to a service-related activity.  The EU is the leading importer and exporter 
of services,16 followed by the US.  Business services play a particularly 
important role in all modern economies and are regarded as essential drivers of 
economic growth.  Many of the activities covered by this sector of the 
economy (legal, accounting and auditing, market research, advertising, and 
other business activities such as computer services, real estate, or R&D) have 
fully exploited the outsourcing phenomenon, which may explain their 
recent rapid growth.  The rapid development of business process 
outsourcing (BPO) is the result of unprecedented advances in information 
and communication technologies (ICT) and their application to everyday 
business.  Outsourcing of legal services typically occurs through sub-
contracting certain services to an independent supplier.  However, large law 
firms may decide to establish their own premises abroad and thus control 
recruitment and training.  This is the case with Clifford Chance in India, for 
instance.  Outsourcing parts of a project has also increased in architecture.  
More specifically, the global market for legal process outsourcing 
(LPO) accounted for over US $1 billion in 2012, growing exponentially 
since the burst of the financial crisis in 2008.  Estimates suggest that LPO 
could grow as much as US $8.5 billion by 2020, leading to the blossoming 
of a new sub-sector of legal services, that is legal support services.17 With 
an average rate of 30 percent annually, LPO is the fastest growing segment 
in India.18 Revenue from LPO is expected to exceed US$1 billion in 2016 
 
 15. See Rainer Lanz & Andreas Maurer, Services and Global Value Chains – Some 
Evidence on Servicification of Manufacturing and Services Networks, WTO Working Paper 
ERSD-2015-03, (2015). 
 16. Being a customs union, the 28 member States of the European Union (EU) are trivially 
taken as one entity (customs territory) in global statistics. 
 17. See Grand View Research, Legal Process Outsourcing (LPO) Market Analysis by 
location, by services and segment forecasts to 2020, April 2014. See also Integreon, ‘Submission 
on Legal Process Outsourcing to ABA Commission on Ethics 20 /20,’ June 2010. 
 18. ValueNotes, LPO fastest growing segment in India, March 12, 2014, http.//www.sourci 
nquotes.com/content/view/913/1. 
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and to employ 32,000 professionals in India.  In addition, it transforms 
outsourcing, as Indian IT companies active in BPO also offer LPO to their 
global clients.  Outsourcing-related work has more recently evolved to satisfy 
demands for higher quality, giving rise to a new phenomenon, called 
‘knowledge process outsourcing’ (KPO).  In India only, KPO employed 
more than 250,000 professionals in 2014.19  
The increasing willingness of companies located in developed 
countries, mainly in Europe and the United States, to outsource noncore 
business functions also reinforces this trend.  This trend was affected by the 
recent financial crisis only momentarily.  From call centers to legal 
research and text editing, manifold operations of developed-country 
companies are supplied by companies established in India, Philippines or 
elsewhere nowadays.20  This phenomenon explains the fact that almost half 
of the cross-border exports of services worldwide is in business services. 
Bar associations acknowledged the paradigm shift and revised their rules to 
accommodate contemporary concerns relating to professional liability, 
integrity and independence.  For instance, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) recently revised its model rules on professional conduct to tackle, inter 
alia, the growing phenomenon of outsourcing.21 
Business services are typically provided to other enterprises (but also 
to public administration), whereby they often become part of complex 
production processes.  Nonetheless, several business services, such as legal, 
engineering or architectural services, are also supplied to households. 
Business services exert an enabling role in bettering competiveness and overall 
performance of any economy.  For instance, in terms of value added, business 
services was the largest sector within the EU-28’s nonfinancial business 
economy.  In the EU, business services account for over half of the non-
financial business economy and for about 30 percent of total trade in services.  
In the EU only, about 21 million people and over 4 million enterprises 
provide services in business services, many of them being small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).22 Legal, accounting, management consultancy, 
engineering and architectural services hold the lion’s share in this area of 
services.23 While hit by the financial crisis, these services recorded double-
digit growth between their mid-crisis lows in 2009 and the second quarter 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. For a study on BPO, see UNCTAD, E- Commerce and Development Report 2003 (United 
Nations Publication, 2003), Chapter 5. http.//www.sourcinquotes.com/content/view/ 913/1. 
 21. See Model Rules of Prof’L Conduct R.5.3 (2012).  
 22. See European Commission, High-Level Group on Business Services – Final Report, 63 (2014). 
 23. “Business services: recent economic developments,” statistics in focus, 
EUROSTAT, Issue 35 (2011). 
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of 2015.24  Export of such services in the EU and the U.S. have also grown 
quite substantially, recording an increase of eight percent and seven 
percent, respectively, in the years 2010-2013.  They both account for 
around 40 percent of global trade in business services.25 
The importance of several business services lies in their added value, 
that is, the overall impact they have on the economy.  Subsectors of 
business services, such as legal services or advertising, have value-added 
traits leading to higher labour productivity and positive spillovers.  For 
instance, advertising is essentially a distributive activity with a high level 
of turnover and high sales relative to personnel costs.  The same goes for 
professional services.  
The growth of the sector globally is driven by strong export demand, 
whereas innovations in ICT increase opportunities for further development 
of the sector trespassing geographical borders and downplaying previously 
insurmountable barriers.  Business, professional and technical services are 
among the most flourishing services sectors in the developed world.26  
Developing countries keep apace closely.  Other than India, where those sectors 
are among the main export sectors, in Brazil, those sectors accounted for 45 
percent of Brazil’s total commercial services exports in 2007, with a value of 
over US$10 billion.  Architectural, engineering and other technical consultancy 
services are the largest subsectors, followed by legal services.  In certain sectors 
like engineering, offshoring is the first stage sometimes leading to bigger shifts 
of production loci in emerging countries.27 
The phenomenon of outsourcing has also contributed greatly to the 
rapid growth of the business sector, as businesses increasingly realize the 
benefits that they can seize by buying business services through specialized 
enterprises instead of producing them in-house.  Having said this, certain 
service activities are more readily exportable than others.  This is due to the 
fact that they are transferable more easily through electronic means, they do 
not require commercial presence (or require only a limited one) nor thorough 
knowledge of the export market, its laws or preferences.  This is, for 
instance, the case with computer services and increasingly with some 
professional services, education or health care services.  The same goes for 
 
 24. See, “Services statistics – short-term indicators,” EUROSTAT, September 2015, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Services_statistics 
_-_short-term_ indicators. 
 25. See WTO, International Trade Statistics 2015, pp. 143, 144. 
 26. Id. at 144. 
 27. See Leonard Lynn and Hal Salzman, Engineers, Firms and Nations: Ethical Dilemmas 
in the New Global Environment, in ENGINEERING ETHICS FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD 15, 20 
(Colleen Murphy et al., eds., 2015). 
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various back office support and so-called knowledge services such as 
research and development. 
 
III. Regulating Professional Services 
  
 A. The Challenges of Regulating Professionals 
 
Services are typically nontangible, nonstorable, and above all 
heterogeneous with limited possibilities of mass production.  Thus, many 
of the most “effective” barriers to free movement of services relate to pre- 
or post-establishment of juridical and natural persons.28 Such barriers are 
typically enshrined in domestic regulations promulgated by public, but also 
private bodies.  Quality, the “holy grail” of every law or regulation governing 
services, is closely intertwined with the characteristics, qualifications, 
experience, and so forth of each individual service provider. This trait of 
services regulations increases the transaction costs and undermines the pursuit 
of efficiency when regulating this highly heterogeneous sector of the economy.  
Regulations on services are designed by a well-intentioned 
government which, driven by public interest considerations, seeks to 
contend with perceived market failures such as those typically associated 
with externalities, information inadequacies, or imperfect competition and 
misuse of market power.29  In the case of professional services, information 
asymmetries and competition concerns appear to be the most important 
market failures.  Information inadequacies mostly appear in a wide range of 
intermediation and knowledge-based services.  The nature of the services 
supply and the direct contact involved between suppliers and consumers 
generate significant risks.  The consequences of asymmetric information 
may not be easily reversible for consumers who lack information about the 
skills that a given service supplier has.30 While the quality of some 
products, such as milk or sugar, can be ascertained on inspection prior to 
sale (search goods), others, including almost all types of services, cannot 
be evaluated until received, used or consumed (experience goods).31  In 
 
 28. Cf Panagiotis Delimatsis, Due Process and “Good” Regulation Embedded in the GATS 
– Disciplining Regulatory Behaviour in Services Through Article VI of the GATS, 10:1 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 13, 16 (2007). 
 29. Carlo Gamberale & Aaditya Mattoo, Domestic Regulations and Liberalization of Trade 
in Services, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 290 (Bernard Hoekman et 
al., eds., 2002); also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15- 35 (1982). 
 30. Cf. Birutė Šiba, supra note 5, at ¶23. 
 31. Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78:2 J. POLIT. ECON. 311 
(1970); also George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84:3 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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extreme cases (e.g., construction of a house ostensibly complying with anti-
seismic regulations), the effects of use or consumption are made known 
only years later (credence goods).32  
Since markets may not provide appropriate incentives for the acquisition 
and dissemination of information, appropriate legislation that requires disclosure 
of certain information could in theory remedy the problem.  Nevertheless, it may 
be too expensive to communicate the necessary information to individual 
consumers.  In such cases, instead of educating the consumers, it is more cost-
effective to regulate suppliers.  In particular, the governmental intervention will 
prescribe the type of information that needs to be provided and will thereby help 
potential buyers evaluate the information that is being supplied. 
An interference with the market may be motivated by the need for 
accomplishing noneconomic, social goals, such as redistribution of income, 
consumer protection, universal service, etc., in order to assure equity, or may even 
take place because of clearly paternalistic motivations.33  These regulatory goals 
are rather horizontal in nature; hence, they are applicable across the board to all 
services sectors.  This fact can be decisive when determining the nature of the 
instruments (e.g., whether they should be specific to a certain sector or of 
general application).  In other words, the fact that similar public policy 
objectives are sought across sectors may be indicative of the need to use 
similar instruments.  This, however, may be way too simplistic an approach, as 
an objective can be served in various degrees; and this already within a given 
services sector such as professional services.  For instance, the higher stakes 
for the consumer and the public good in the area of engineering rather than 
advertising services will lead to heavier regulation of access to the former 
profession.  In this case, ex ante regulatory intervention acts preventively.  
Professional services are regarded as labour-intensive services.  Their central 
trait is the supply of human capital acquired through high standards of education 
and training.  In addition, access to professional services is typically subject to 
certain licensing and qualification requirements, which determine issues relating 
to entry and practice of a given profession.34  Such requirements are imposed 
either by the State or through self-regulation by professional bodies – or both.  In 
the latter case, access restrictions imposed by professional bodies dominated by 
active market participants are not based on quality-related considerations but aim 
 
 32. Michael Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 
16:1 J. LAW ECON. 67 (1973). The authors demonstrate that in the case of goods that have 
credence qualities, a governmental intervention would not lead to an efficient allocation of 
resources and thus would be preferable to leave the market unregulated. 
 33. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 51 (1994). 
 34. See, Duc Nguyen-Hong, “Restrictions on Trade in Professional Services,” Productivity 
Commission Staff Research Paper, (2000). 
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many times at restricting supply of newcomers artificially, thereby keeping 
prices at a high level to the benefit of incumbents.35  For instance, studies 
showed that State licensing requirements and ABA regulations lead to excessive 
earnings premiums for lawyers.36 
Typically, in this case the regulating bodies of the professional 
associations are the fora whereby like-minded incumbents harmonize their 
practice and essentially act as yet another cartel.37  As noted recently by the 
United States Supreme Court in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC, dual allegiances are not always apparent to a professional 
who also acts as a regulator.38  The resulting monopoly outcome reallocates 
income from lower income consumers to higher income professionals.39 
Harmonization and mutual recognition efforts in the area of business 
services and notably professional services already within the EU, which is a 
fairly integrated example of transnational legal order, have met with limited 
overall success to date.40  Even for professional services, where automatic 
recognition of professional qualifications was agreed on within the EU, such as 
architecture, one should not lose sight of the fact that this was the result of 
lengthy negotiations and discussions that lasted more than fifteen years.41 
This is not to say that harmonization and mutual recognition in the area of 
professions is a walkover.  On the contrary, professional peculiarities abound and 
complicate any effort to draw common standards even within federal or quasi-
federal, decentralized systems.  To name but one example, because of the 
heterogeneous country-specific characteristics and requirements of practice in the 
engineering profession, automatic recognition may not be the wisest option.  
All these professional peculiarities highlight the difficulties that any 
horizontal, i.e., across-services sectors, regulatory intervention may face. 
 
 35. See MORRIS KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING 
COMPETITION? 65 – 96 (2006). 
 36. Such premiums amounted to $64 billion in 2004, or $71,000 per lawyer. See CLIFFORD 
WINSTON ET. AL, FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011). 
 37. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2014). 
 38. The Court noted that for this reason antitrust accountability is necessary to ensure the 
undistorted functioning of markets. See, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. 
FTC, 574 U.S. __ (2015); also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U. S. 
492, 500 (1988). 
 39. Maury Gittleman et al., Analyzing the Labor Market Outcomes of Occupational 
Licensing, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20961, (2015). 
 40. See TINNE HEREMANS, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES IN EU INTERNAL MARKET – QUALITY 
REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION (2012). 
 41. EEC Directive 85/384/EEC 1985 OJ L 223/15 on the mutual recognition of diplomas, 
certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications in architecture, including measures to 
facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. 
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Within the EU, two major achievements in the wake of the new millennium 
gave a new impetus to the liberalization of regulated professions.42  The 
first is the adoption of the directive on professional qualifications (PQD) 
providing for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications for such 
professions.43  Contrary to previous practice, the directive also called for 
the recognition of qualifications of those professionals who offer their 
services in another EU Member State (MS) only temporarily.  In addition, the 
directive confirmed the automatic recognition for certain professions, such as 
doctors, architects or midwives,44 and in essence requires the mutual 
recognition of practical experience for professionals.  The most recent directive 
amending the PQD introduced the European professional card, a mechanism 
that will further lead to the erosion of protectionist biases by host MS, but also 
facilitate mobility of professionals within the EU.45  For instance, in several 
EU MS the use of the engineering card, a professional card for engineers, 
which documents educational and professional qualifications and other 
information with a view to simplifying recognition, is a reality for the sector.46   
The other achievement in the realm of liberal professions in the EU was the 
adoption of the Services Directive.47  To be sure, its timing was unfortunate, as it 
was associated with the fear of several MS against uncontrolled flows of migrants 
from the new Eastern European MS to the “old” EU15 MS.  Thus, the major tool 
to achieve full integration in the area of services, i.e., the country of origin 
principle, did not find its way to the final text of the Directive.  Having said that, 
this principle was replaced by the principle of free movement in services set out in 
Article 16 of the Services Directive.48  In addition, the Services Directive is an 
important legislative development in that it confirmed the importance of home 
country control49 and that the host country can only take measures in exceptional 
 
 42. See Panagiotis Delimatsis, Standardization in Services – European Ambitions and 
Sectoral Realities, 3 EUR. L. REV. 513 (2016). See also Erik Canton et al., The Economic Impact 
of Professional Services Liberalization, European Commission Economic Papers No 533, (2014). 
 43. Directive 2005/36/EC on professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255/22. 
 44. Automatic recognition means that no discretion is left to the host country. See Case C-
365/13, Ordre des architects, E.C.R. 280. 
 45. See Counsil Directive 2013/55, 2013 O.J. (L. 354/132) (EU). See also European 
Commission, “Action Lines for Liberal Professions – Final Report of the Working Group,” 7 
(2015).  
 46. See High- Leval Group on Business Services, note 22, at 120. 
 47. Council Directive 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L376/36) [hereinafter Services Directive].  
 48. See European Commission, Handbook on the implementation of the Services 
Directive 36 (2007). 
 49. See also Case C-458/08, Commission v Portugal, 2010 E.C.R. I-11599. This is also in 
line with the expression of the principle of mutual recognition in the area of services in cases like 
C-76/90, Säger, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221; Cipolla, supra note 6. 
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circumstances relating to the safety of a given service.50 
There are 4,600 regulated professions in the EU nowadays.  In the case of 
professional services, an important subsector of business services, regulatory 
diversity already at a subnational level creates challenges for service suppliers who 
are interested in exploring market access opportunities beyond their region.  
Professional services regulations may differ substantially among the various 
professions based on manifold public policy considerations, but also long-standing 
traditions protected faithfully by professional associations.  This sector displays 
restrictive regulatory measures spanning from burdensome entry requirements 
(e.g., licensing restrictions or onerous procedures) to sometimes prohibitive post-
entry requirements, such as restrictions (or even outright prohibitions) on 
advertising; fixed or recommended minimum or maximum prices; reserved tasks 
and exclusive rights; or mandatory business structure and multidisciplinary 
practices.51  This indicates that, even within highly integrated markets, such as the 
U.S. or the EU, services maintain their trait of being very vulnerable to regulations 
impeding their supply.52 
 
B. Delegation, Self-Regulation, Co-Regulation 
  
As noted earlier, the potentially chilling effect of regulations is in part due to 
the peculiar nature of services relating to the intangibility, nonstorability and 
heterogeneity.  It is all the more so in professional services where serving the 
interests of each client necessitates a different treatment by the professional service 
supplier.  In addition, the quality of the service is closely intertwined with the 
characteristics, education, qualifications, or experience of each individual service 
provider, as well as the domestic preferences and traditions of each EU MS.  
It is in part this peculiar nature of services that had led several 
countries to abandon “command-and-control” regulation in professional 
services and essentially outsource the establishment of rules relating to the 
access and pursuit of a profession to the respective professional 
associations.  The fact that professionals in the three professions covered in 
this article have grown in prominence is also a factor that made self-
regulation be regarded as an appealing alternative to state regulation. Crucially, 
private ordering in the field of professional services has been diachronic; such 
rules existed before the adoption of public regulation; once the latter emerged, 
private ordering has coexisted with – and many times de facto superseded – 
public forms of regulation. 
 
 50. See Art. 18 in conjunction with Art. 35 of the Services Directive, supra note 47. 
 51. Cf.  Report on Competition in Professional Services, COM(2004) 83 (EC). 
 52. See also PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND DOMESTIC 
REGULATIONS – NECESSITY, TRANSPARENCY AND REGULATORY DIVERSITY 62 (2007).  
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Self-regulation entails an explicit or tacit transfer of authority to 
private bodies, which allows them to delineate a sphere of expertise, 
establish conditions for membership, limit competition for nonmembers (either 
because they objectively do not qualify or because the incumbents want to 
maximise their rents), and impose deontological rules of conduct on 
professionals which would protect the integrity of the profession and ensure 
the quality of the service provided.53  Self-regulation further entails monitoring 
of compliance with such rules and instituting enforcement mechanisms.54  
Compliance in particular with private enforcement mechanisms would be a 
function of the importance of the membership.  If exit is costly, then 
compliance will most likely occur to avoid negative effects on the possibility 
for trading in the future. 
Professional associations regulate access and pursuit of a given 
profession ostensibly with a view to ensuring high levels of consumer 
protection.  However, they also represent the professionals.  Therefore, 
their role is to promote the interests of their members.  More often than not, 
the two functions (regulatory and representative) cannot be easily reconciled.  
Thus, conflicts of interest may and do actually arise, notably because of the 
exercise of this dual function performed by private regulators.  
In establishing rules relating to the regulation of professions, the 
private sector is called upon to fulfill a decisive regulatory role and serve 
the objective of managing access to the profession with a view to 
improving efficiency, quality, and competitiveness.  Surveillance and 
enforcement of these rules is typically guaranteed by the fact that 
registration with the relevant professional body is a precondition for the 
taking up and pursuit of the particular profession at issue.  Compulsory 
registration allows for more effective supervision of professional conduct 
and, accordingly, sanctions against those professionals who do not adhere 
to the rules established by the professional body, including deontological 
rules usually contained in the respective sectoral code of conduct (CoC). 
Disciplinary cases can be treated more efficiently due to the Damoclean 
sword of exclusion from the club in case of noncompliance.55  
According to Dixit, such relation-based governance systems can work 
only provided that, (i) the norms of good conduct are clearly understood; 
 
 53. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN 
POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE (1994). 
 54. See also Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of 
Regulation and Self-Regulation in a Post-regulating World, 54 in CURRENT LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 103 (2001).  
 55. See also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
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and (ii) information about adherence or rather violations of these norms 
must be diffused to all members of the association accurately and quickly.56 
However, in practice, the accuracy of communication and adherence to the 
norms and collective sanctions which is necessary for the success of such 
associations can be challenged by the number and heterogeneity of 
transactors and the increased size and complexity of transactions.57  Indeed, 
self-regulation seems to work better in small, relatively homogeneous and 
interconnected industries where the threat of outside regulation adequately 
incentivizes the industry to regulate itself.58 More generally, good 
regulation nowadays implies that a regulator is able to adopt different 
responsive enforcement strategies depending on whether the regulatee is a 
leader, reluctant complier, the recalcitrant or the incompetent.59  
To retain self-regulatory powers, professional associations emphasize 
the central role of specialized expertise and the existing institutional 
arrangements to maintain the benefits of such expertise.  This would allow 
them to create their own “living space,” shielded from the market and the 
state.60  This may be necessary in order to protect their alleged uniqueness and 
independence.  For instance, the preamble of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the American Bar Association (ABA) provides: 
 
The legal profession is largely self-governing.  Although 
other professions also have been granted powers of self-
government, the legal profession is unique in this respect 
because of the close relationship between the profession and 
the processes of government and law enforcement.  This 
connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority 
 
 56. Avinash Dixit, “Relation-based Governance and Competition” (on file with the author). 
 57. Others have argued that the a coordinating function ensuring a common logic, i.e., a 
system of reasoning that generates unique common knowledge classifications of conduct, 
provided by a third-party (private) institution supplying a system of neutral reasoning could 
ensure the sustainability of a decentralized enforcement system. See Gillian Hadfield & Barry 
Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order, 4:2 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 471 (2012). 
 58. Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146, 154 (Richard Baldwin et al., eds., 2010). 
 59. Neil Gunningham, Enforcement and Compliance Strategies, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 121, 126 (Richard Baldwin et al., eds., 2010). 
 60. See Tanina Rostain, Self-Regulatory Authority, Markets, and the Ideology of 
Professionalism, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 169, 170 (Richard Baldwin et al. 
eds., 2010), noting that “as professions obtained self-regulatory powers, they instituted 
measures – including educational and accreditation standards, ethics codes, and workplace 
structures – to demarcate spaces of discretionary expertise insulated from penetration by 
either market logic or state control.” 
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over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.  
 
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their 
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation 
is obviated.  Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal 
profession’s independence from government domination.  An 
independent legal profession is an important force in 
preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority 
is more readily challenged by a profession whose members 
are not dependent on government for the right to practice. 
 
By the same token, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
(CCBE), which is the ABA counterpart in Europe, has also taken issue with 
public regulation in the field of legal services by emphasizing that:61  
 
An independent legal profession is the cornerstone of a free 
and democratic society.  Self-regulation, conceptually, must 
be seen as a corollary to the core value of independence.  
Self-regulation addresses the collective independence of the 
members of the legal profession.  Exclusive direct state 
regulation, without a leading role for the profession in the 
setting and enforcing of standards of conduct and of service, 
is incompatible with an independent legal profession.  
 
The CCBE went on to underscore the benefits of self-regulation such as 
voluntary availability of expertise to regulate the subject matters relating to the 
legal profession, high level of acceptance of standards set and enforced by 
professional colleagues, flexibility and cost-effectiveness. 
The importance of the independence of the legal profession has also been 
hailed by the judiciary.  The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Law Society of British Columbia ruled:62 
 
 61. See CCBE Position on Regulatory and Representative Functions of Bars (June 
2005), http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/ccbe_position_on_reg 
1_1182254709.pdf (last visited on Jan. 15, 2016). 
 62. Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Columbia (1982) 2.S.CR. 307, 
336-7 (Can.).  See also Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Lawyers 
Collective v. Bar Council of India and others, W.P. 1526/1995, at ¶56 (2009).  See, along 
these lines, the statement by the CJEU in Jakubowska: “The absence of conflicts of interest 
is essential to the practice of the profession of lawyer and requires, in particular, that 
lawyers should be in a situation of independence vis-à-vis the public authorities and other 
operators, by whom they must never be influenced.” C-225/09, 729, ¶61 (2010). 
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The independence of the Bar from the state in all its 
pervasive manifestations is one of the hallmarks of a free 
society.  Consequently, regulation of these members of the 
law profession by the state must, so far as by human 
ingenuity it can be so designed, be free from state 
interference, in the political sense, with the delivery of 
services to the individual citizens in the state, 
particularly in fields of public and criminal law.  The 
public interest in a free society knows no area more 
sensitive than the independence, impartiality and 
availability to the general public of the members of the 
Bar and through those members, legal advice and 
services generally.  The uniqueness of position of the 
barrister and solicitor in the community may well have 
led the province to select self-administration as the 
mode for administrative control over the supply of legal 
services throughout the community.  
 
In India, the Apex Court noted in Indian Council of Legal Aid and 
Advice v. Bar Council of India that:63 
 
The bar Councils are enjoined with the duty to act as 
sentinels of professional conduct and must ensure that 
the dignity and purity of the profession are in no way 
undermined.  Its job is to uphold the standards of 
professional conduct and etiquette.  Thus, every State 
Bar Council and the Bar Council of India has a public 
duty to perform, namely, to ensure that the monopoly of 
practice granted under the Act is not misused or abused 
by a person who is enrolled as an advocate.  The Bar 
Councils have been created at the State level as well as 
the Central level not only to protect the rights, interests 
and privileges of its members but also to protect the 
litigating public by ensuring that high and noble 
traditions are maintained so that the purity and dignity 
of the profession are not jeopardized.  It is generally 
believed that members of the legal profession have 
certain social obligations, e.g., to render “pro bono 
 
 63. Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India 1995 1 SCC 732 (India). 
2017] The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation 17 
publico” service to the poor and the underprivileged.  
Since the duty of a lawyer is to assist the court in the 
administration of justice, the practice of law has a 
public utility flavour and, therefore, he must strictly and 
scrupulously abide by the Code of Conduct behoving 
the noble profession and must not indulge in any activity 
which may tend to lower the image of the profession in 
society.  That is why the functions of the Bar Council 
include the laying down of standards of professional 
conduct and etiquette which advocates must follow to 
maintain the dignity and purity of the profession. 
 
In a similar vein, the US Supreme Court stated in Goldfarb:64 
 
The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is 
especially great since lawyers are essential to the 
primary governmental function of administering justice, 
and have historically been “officers of the courts.” 
 
However, the more such associations control the market for the supply 
of a given service, the more frequent complaints of their excessive power 
and abuse become.  Furthermore, regulatory capture can occur not only 
when governments regulate, but also in the case of self-regulation by 
professional associations.65 In addition, existing barriers relating, for instance, 
to lack of recognition of professional qualifications or to licensing conditions 
generate deadweight losses.  These characteristics of services regulations 
increase transaction costs and can undermine the pursuit of efficiency when 
regulating this highly heterogeneous sector of the economy. This regularly 
leads governmental authorities to scrutinize complaints about anticompetitive 
practices, market foreclosure, excessive prices and monopolies, and to balance 
the interest of maintaining the delegation of power to such private bodies 
against the public interest.  Some go as far as to advocate deregulation of 
certain professional services.66  
A central issue in professional services is what form of regulation can 
 
 64. Lewis Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773 (1975). 
 65. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971); 
Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335 (1974); & John 
Kay, The Forms of Regulation, FINANCIAL REGULATION – OR OVER-REGULATION 33 (Arthur 
Seldon, ed., 1998).  
 66. See, with respect to the legal sector, James Moliterno, The Trouble with Lawyer 
Regulation, 62 EMORY LAW J. 101 (2013). 
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better achieve the legitimate objectives that are relevant for each 
profession, such as the integrity of the profession, professional competence, 
consumer protection and the like.  Typically, state intervention is premised 
on the need to address market failures, most notably created by information 
asymmetries between service providers and their clients regarding the 
quality of services rendered.  Indeed, where information costs are high, ex 
ante regulation of the industry and setting of quality standards may be an 
adequate form of regulation.  Opponents of self-regulation would argue that 
it can only be justified by a self-interest maximiser viewpoint,67 as the 
protection of public interest can only be ensured by state intervention.  This 
paternalistic view is premised on the belief that professional associations 
cannot adequately protect the interests of their members and those of 
consumers at the same time.  Consumer lobbies may actually also subscribe 
to this paternalistic view, notably on price competition grounds.  
On the other side of the spectrum, proponents of self-regulation would 
argue that a bottom-up approach would be more apposite due to expertise 
and insider knowledge that only the professionals themselves may have. 
Especially when the private group entrusted with self-regulatory powers is 
sufficiently cohesive or solidary and pursues State-like objectives, thereby 
acting as another agent of the State, transfer of resources to such groups 
appears to be the most efficient solution for the State.68 Professional 
associations can draft and review rules more quickly and flexibly than any 
State authority to better serve consumers without unduly hampering the 
supply of the services at issue.  Norm-making groups may also adapt more 
quickly in the aftermath of exogenous shocks, thereby showing their 
mutability forces that partly explain their dominance in norm-making.69 In 
that case, any state interference would be counter-productive, whereas any 
legal rules designed to regulate intra-group relations would negatively affect 
the group’s ability to regulate its members.  In fact, with the exception of rules 
that deter extreme bad faith conduct, even rules that merely duplicate the 
group’s own norms will generally undermine self-regulation.70 
Self-regulation cannot be regarded as an absolute prerogative, as 
 
 67. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBOURS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991), using several case-studies to show that members of a close-knit group 
develop and abide by norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that 
members obtain in their work-a-day affairs with one another. 
 68. See Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal 
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 CHICAGO L. REV. 133, 136 (1996). 
 69. See, generally, RESILIENT LIBERALISM IN EUROPE’S POLITICAL ECONOMY, (Vivien 
Schmidt & Mark Thatcher, eds., 2015); Robert Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3: 1 
AM. L.& ECON. REV. 1, 22 (2001). 
 70. Id. 
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private groups exercise power that can be reclaimed by the state or 
constrained by the public judicial system.  More generally, experiments 
with regulation and regulatory approaches are a frequent phenomenon 
nowadays.71  Co-regulation or cooperative regulation in several sectors of the 
economy is, for instance, a form of regulation that goes beyond the coercion 
that State authority can exert.72  Co-regulatory approaches allow self-regulation 
and state regulation to meet with a view to optimizing regulatory performance 
and more efficiently addressing market failures and certain malfunctions.  
In the case of important unforeseen negative externalities, 
governments can reclaim authority anytime, notably taking advantage of 
the elusive nature of the concept of “public interest.”73 For instance, the 
recent Legal Services Act in England challenges the earlier unfettered 
power of the Law Society of England and Wales to regulate the legal 
profession.  A new oversight regulator, the Legal Services Board (LSB), is 
created to serve as a single, independent, and publicly accountable regulator 
with the power to enforce high standards in the legal sector and oversee the 
approved regulators such as the Law Society.  Approved regulators are now 
obliged to distinguish among representative and regulatory functions.  The Act 
also creates an Office of Legal Complaints (OLC), which removes handling 
of complaints by the legal profession in order to restore consumer 
confidence that complaints are handled independently and without self-
interest; that they are handled efficiently, fairly and quickly.74 In 2010, the 
OLC established the Legal Ombudsman, who is in charge of complaints 
against lawyers in England and Wales.  The dispute resolution services 
offered are free of charge, in principle.  In 2014-15 alone, the Ombudsman 
services helped resolve about 7,500 complaints.75 
 
 71. Cf. Grainne de Búrca, Robert Keohane & Charles Sabel, Global Experimentalist 
Governance, 44(3) BRIT. J. POLIT. SCI. 477 (2014). 
 72. One of the OECD best practices in regulating professional services suggests that 
professional associations should not be granted exclusive jurisdiction and rather be subject 
to independent (probably state-centered) scrutiny in making decisions about entrance 
requirements, mutual recognition, or the boundary of their exclusive rights. See OECD 
Summary Report of the Study on Globalisation and Innovation in the Business Services 
Sector, at 16 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/55/38619867.pdf. 
 73. See Mike Feintuck, Regulatory Rationales beyond the Economic: In Search of the 
Public Interest, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 39, 45 (Richard Baldwin et al., 
eds., 2010). 
 74. UK Ministry of Justice, Legal Services Bill – Regulatory Impact Assessment, 10 
(2006), http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/legalservicesbill.htm.   
 75. Over one fifth of these complaints relates to residential conveyancing. See The 
Office for Legal Complaints/Legal Ombudsman, Annual Report and Accounts for the Year 
Ending 31 March 2015 (2016), http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/09/Annual-Report-2014-15.pdf.   
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Similar concerns in Australia led the government to step in to 
essentially end self-regulation in the legal profession.  This was, for 
instance, the case through the Queensland Legal Profession Act of 2007.  
More recently, it appears that Australia has moved towards co-regulation 
that distinguishes between regulatory and representative functions of the 
Bar, while relying on the integrated involvement of government, the legal 
profession and the courts.76  Although these changes were initially backed 
up by all territories, in the end, only two Australian jurisdictions decided to 
move forward with sweeping reforms in the legal sector.  In July 2015, 
New South Wales and Victoria (accounting for approximately 80 percent 
of practising lawyers in Australia) started applying the Legal Profession 
Uniform Law,77 which creates a Legal Services Council as the overseeing 
body, but resolutely moves towards principles-based regulation of the legal 
profession with clearly established regulatory objectives, a first for the 
Australian legal sector.  Day-to-day regulation remains with the 
relevant regulatory bodies such as the Law Council of Australia (for 
solicitors) and the Australian Bar Association (for barristers) .  The 
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner is in charge of complaints 
against lawyers based on the Uniform Law Application Act of 2014.  
Divergences in regulatory approaches affect the degree of influence of 
professional associations on the making of rules that affect them.  
The situation, including the issue of enforcing professional 
obligations against wrongdoers, becomes more complex once self-regulation 
of a given profession becomes borderless at the transnational level.  Issues of 
jurisdiction and conflict surface and, quite astonishingly, their complexity 
nourishes the evolution of transnational regulation and private ordering.  As a 
rule, professions dislike public rules and governmental intervention.  This 
should not be taken to mean that the rules created by private bodies have a 
different starting point than that of public rules: They both aim to create “social 
order by focusing or channelling the diverse, arbitrary, even chaotic motives or 
actions of individuals into a few socially privileged alleys by making 
compliance a normative demand.”78  To be sure, compliance may be ensured 
through different avenues and at a varying degree. 
 
 
 76. Paul Paton, Cooperation, Co-option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer Guidance and 
Regulation of the Legal Profession, JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 165, 166 (2010). 
 77. The Uniform Law Framework consists of various sets of rules. See Legal Services 
Council, Uniform Law, http://www.legalservicescouncil.org.au/Pages/uniform-rules/unif 
orm-rules.aspx.  
 78. See Marietta Auer, The Anti-Network. A Comment on Annelise Riles, 56 AM. J. 
COMP.  LAW  631, 636-7 (2008). 
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C. Trade in Professional Services – The WTO and the 
Manifold Preferential Trade Agreements   
   
One notable exception where the interests of professionals meet those of 
their governments seems to be the work undertaken by the WTO regarding 
progressive liberalization of market access in professional services.  
Professional services were among the first sectors that the WTO negotiators 
identified as a priority in the 1990s.  Professional services had already been 
tackled in a working group that was established on May 11, 1990, during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, along with working groups on financial, 
transport, and tourism services.79  At the end of the Uruguay Round in 1995, a 
Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS) was created whose mandate 
was twofold: First, it was instructed to examine and recommend any possible 
disciplines, which would ensure that measures regarding qualifications, 
licensing, and technical standards do not unduly distort trade in professional 
services.  Second, as a matter of priority, the WPPS had to concentrate on the 
elaboration of multilateral disciplines on the accountancy sector to give 
operational effect to specific commitments under the GATS.  
Work on accountancy sector was completed on December 14, 1998, 
with the adoption by the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) of the 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector (“the 
accountancy disciplines”).80  The accountancy disciplines do not tackle the 
substantive content of qualifications or standards in accountancy.  Setting 
the level of qualifications or the content of technical standards of any kind 
to be required of suppliers of accountancy services essentially remains a 
prerogative for each Member or the delegated national authority. 
Nevertheless, these disciplines do envisage, for the most part, the need to 
ensure procedural transparency in matters of licensing and qualification. 
The disciplines are not yet binding and the current Doha Round stalemate 
renders their entry into force uncertain.  
Within the broad range of professional services, the decision to start 
with accountancy services was intentional.  Two factors are regarded as 
determinative in this choice: First, the relevant industry had a great interest 
in the development of a sector that was expanding rapidly worldwide and 
was deemed a crucial infrastructural element of financial services.  Already 
 
 79. JV. Reyna, Services in  VOL II: COMMENTARY, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) at 2373, (Terence Stewart ed., 1993). 
 80. Council for Trade in Services, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the 
Accountancy Sector, WTO Doc. S/L/64 (1998). 
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during the Uruguay Round, the United States had proposed the endorsement 
of an Annex on Professional Accountancy Services.81  The second factor 
relates to the level of integration that the accountancy services demonstrated at 
that point of time, which was considerable if compared to other professional 
services.82  In preparing those rules on accountancy, the WTO had to consult 
with several international organizations such as the International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC), the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO).  This was also very helpful for the WPPS work relating to the 
preparation of the voluntary Guidelines for Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) in the Accountancy Sector,83 which matched work 
that is also done in the relevant international organizations.  On the other 
side, the WPPS preferred not to intermingle with standardization issues in 
this field, which are dealt with elsewhere.84  
The successor of the WPPS, the Working Party on Domestic 
Regulation (WPDR) has also been tasked with building bridges with 
international professional associations to examine the possibility of 
applying the accountancy disciplines to other professions as well.85 Several 
professional associations reacted positively or critically.86  Their reaction, 
however, shows that they believe in the multilateral process and the 
necessity of this type of public rules that couple their efforts towards 
further integration within their profession in a globalized world.87  For 
 
 81. Working Group on Professional Services, Note on the Meeting of 3-4 October 1990, 
GATT MTN.GNS.PROF/W/2 (1990). 
     82. Cf.Working Party on Professional Services, Functions of the Working Party on 
Professional Services in Relation to Accountancy, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 4, WTO 
Doc. S/WPPS/W/1 (1995). 
 83. Working Party on Professional Services, Guidelines for Mutual Recognition 
Agreements or Arrangements in the Accountancy Sector, WTO Doc. 
S/WPPS/W/12/Rev.1 (1997).  See also Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines for 
Mutual Recognition Agreements or Arrangements in the Accountancy Sector , WTO 
Doc. S/L/38 (1997). 
 84. Singapore WTO  Ministerial, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996). According to Trachtman, this statement “signals the WTO’s 
deference and, in effect, delegation (at least in part), to these organizations. Thus, the 
WTO has ‘delegated’ to specific functional organizations the task of establishing 
standards to facilitate the free movement of accountancy services.” Joel Trachtman, 
Accounting Standards and Trade Disciplines – Irreconcilable Differences?, 31:6 J. 
WORLD TRADE 70 (1997).  
 85. Members were also asked to consult with domestic professional associations on 
the same matter. 
 86. See Working Party on Domestic Regulation – Results of Secretariat 
Consultations with International Professional Services Associations  JOB(03)/126, 
(June 25, 2003) (Informal Note by the Secretariat). 
 87. The fact that the GATS also applies to rules promulgated by self-regulating bodies may 
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instance, in 2003, the Council of the International Bar Association (IBA) 
adopted a resolution in support of a system of terminology for legal 
services for the purposes of international trade negotiations, but also 
general principles for the establishment and regulation of foreign lawyers.88 
At the regional level, professional services were part of the trade 
agenda from early on.  For instance, already in the U.S. - Canada Free 
Trade Agreement of 1988, and subsequently in NAFTA in 1994,89 there were 
provisions regulating trade in professional services.  An Annex on Professional 
Services incorporates provisions relating to transparency, the development of 
international standards, temporary licensing and review procedures.  
Nowadays, virtually all regional trade agreements are aimed at advancing 
trade in professional services, as they play a very important role as inputs 
of other services and generate important value added.  Negotiation of 
MRAs can be a particularly useful tool in this regard.  In NAFTA, for 
instance, MRAs were approved for engineers and architects. In both cases, 
professional regulatory bodies came together to liberalize practice across 
borders in USA, Canada and Mexico within the spirit of NAFTA Chapter 
16.  According to the tripartite MRA:90 
 
Architects registered in a jurisdiction are required to 
follow the laws and codes in force in each jurisdiction 
in which they have been authorized to practice.  Architects 
practicing outside their own country under this agreement are 
limited to providing those services that local architects are 
permitted to provide and will only provide those services they 
customarily provide in their own country if less than those 
services permitted in the host jurisdiction. 
 
By the same token, in ASEAN an MRA allows engineers to move 
freely in the territories of the ASEAN signatories provided that they satisfy 
the requirements for acquiring the title of the ASEAN Chartered 
Professional Engineer (ACPE).  There are also agreements that are based 
on the concept that a person recognized in one country as attaining the 
 
also be a factor that calls for the proactive involvement of professional associations. 
 88. Council for Trade in Service, Legal Services, WTO Doc. S/C/W/318 (2010). 
 89. Professional services were ostensibly included in the agenda because of the architectural 
profession. This resulted in an annex proposing that the architectural professions in Canada and 
the U.S.A. work towards the establishment of similar standards vis-à-vis accreditation, 
internships, examinations and ethics. See OECD International Trade in Professional and 
Educational Services: Implications for the Professions and Higher Education, at 4 (2001). 
 90. Tri-National Mutual Recognition Agreement for International Practice, art. 3.3, Oct. 7, 2005. 
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agreed international standard of competence should only be minimally 
assessed (mainly for local knowledge) before obtaining registration in 
another country party to the agreement.  Such agreements are the APEC 
Engineer Agreement and the Engineers Mobility Forum Agreement.  Both 
agreements are largely administered by engineering bodies.  This underlines 
time and again the role of private actors in the regulation of professions at a 
supranational level. 
More recently, the chapter relating to trade in services within the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) included an Annex on Professional Services.91 
Interestingly, the TPP parties have included only two Annexes in the chapter of 
the agreement relating to services, the other one being in the area of express 
delivery services.  
TPP Parties have agreed to the creation of a Professional Services 
Working Group.92 With respect to architectural and engineering services, 
the agreement refers to the APEC Engineer and Architect frameworks, 
respectively, and calls for the creation of MRAs.  Interestingly, following 
the NAFTA model, the TPP encourages the implementation of temporary 
or project-specific licensing and registration procedures based on the 
home country titles and licenses.  With respect to legal services, the TPP 
recognizes the importance of transnational legal services for trade and 
investment and in promoting economic growth and business confidence.  
According to TPP, foreign lawyers should be able to practice the law of 
their home jurisdiction abroad and participate in commercial arbitration, 
conciliation or mediation proceedings.  The open-ended list of 
possibilities for transnational supply of legal services and the scope of 
cooperation with domestic lawyers appears quite broad.  Thus, 
cooperation of the regulating bodies will be of dire need.  The role of the 
Working Group is indeed to support the professional bodies in liaising 
with one another.  Progress should be discussed annually.  Similar 
mechanisms are to be expected in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).  The EU has proposed, for instance, the creation of a 
Committee on the Recognition of Professional Qualification, but again, 
no tangible results will be yielded without the active participation of 
professional bodies.  
 
 
 
 91. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Annex 10-A Agreed on Jan. 26, 2016, https:// 
www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/10.-Cross-Border-Trade-in-
Services-Chapter.pdf? [hereinafter TPP Final Text]. 
 92. See TPP Final Text, supra note 91, at art. 10.9. 
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IV. The Transnational Dimension of Regulating Professional 
Services 
  
A. Two-Dimensional Transnational Private Regulation  of 
Professional Services 
  
Transnational law of professional services is a dynamic process with 
strong normative characteristics led by predominantly private actors.93 The 
transnational dimension in professional services should be examined at two 
different levels.  The first refers to the level of firm; more specifically, large 
professional service firms that are active in supplying accountancy and 
auditing, legal, management consulting, and advertising services worldwide.  
Foreign earnings of those firms sometimes surpass domestic revenues.  
International operations of such large firms are typically organized as loose 
collections of rather autonomous, locallyowned partnerships.  These 
partnerships are linked to an international organism that may have coordinating 
responsibilities, among others.  As business strategies become more 
intertwined and companies strive for higher returns through diversification, 
market boundaries faint.  For instance, large accounting firms regularly 
provide management advisory services, whereas internationally active law 
firms equally are active in areas of tax and trust and estates, very much like 
accounting firms.  This is not an exclusively developed-country phenomenon; 
rather, the quest for new markets leads firms to seek market shares in the 
developing world as well, where concentration of power to few may be easier 
due to the weaknesses of domestic market structures and antitrust law. 
In other cases, professional services have been traditionally 
interconnected (or in certain cases, vertically integrated), sometimes 
displaying characteristics of complementarity.  This is the case of 
architectural and engineering services, along with construction services. 
Architectural firms prepare blueprints and designs for buildings, whereas 
engineering firms provide services relating to planning, design, 
construction and management for buildings, installations, civil engineering 
works and industrial processes.  Consulting engineers, on the other hand, 
may work hand in hand with architects from the very early stage of a 
project.94 Research is still at its infancy when it comes to deciphering the 
interrelations among various professional services and the function of so-
 
 93. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996). 
 94. Cf. Council for Trade in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat: 
Architectural Sevices, WTO Doc.S/C.W303, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2009). 
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called “professional service supply chains.”95 
The second level relates to professional associations. Internationalization of 
business gave rise to the creation of international professional bodies that 
promote the adoption of business-friendly rules transcending national frontiers to 
the benefit of professionals.  Individual professionals are only indirectly 
represented in these attempts, as their voices are heard exclusively at the level of 
each national professional association.  In turn, international professional 
associations consist predominantly of a group of national associations.  In this 
sense, rule-making of international professional associations raises questions of 
good governance similar to rule-making of international organizations.  
However, there may also be associations that follow a more representative or 
mixed form of organization.  For instance, the legal profession at the global level 
is represented not only by the IBA, which is closer to the Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition, but also by the International Union of Lawyers (Union Internationale 
des Avocats – UIA).  The UIA claims to be the most representative international 
association of lawyers in Europe, South America and Africa. Thus, already in 
this area of professional services, elements of fragmentation alluding to possible 
conflicts and overlaps are present.  For our purposes here, it bears noting that 
both bodies have international coverage and their membership includes national 
professional associations and individual lawyers.96  
 
B. The International Professional Associations 
  
Although the creation of professional associations at the international 
level has traditionally improved cooperation and exchange of information 
in various professions, notably on issues such as education, professional 
qualifications and international standards, this phenomenon has intensified 
due to the globalization of business.  As business expands beyond national 
borders, professional service suppliers equally expand their spectrum of 
activity.  However, supply of professional services at a transnational level 
can be hampered by various impediments notably of regulatory nature.  
The need to facilitate access and enhance convergence with respect to 
applicable rules, but also to capture activities national laws cannot, led to 
the creation of sectoral non-governmental organizations at the international 
level.  Furthermore, as the locus of legal services supply shifts at the global 
 
 95. These are defined as systematic sequences of professional, clerical, and technical 
services explicitly set up to provide specific services, such as producing a financial product, 
designing a house, or replacing a hip. See Jean Harvey, Professional Service Supply Chains, 
42-43 J. OPER. MANAG. 52 (2016). 
 96. Council for Trade in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat: Legal Services, WTO 
Doc. S/C/W/43, at 18 (1998). 
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level, the public interest dimension of the practice of law faints, leading 
benevolent professionals in efforts to ensure the quality of the legal 
services even at the global level.97  We discuss the main features of these 
organizations in the areas of law, engineering, and architecture in turn.  
As a prelude, a common characteristic of these regimes is their 
fragmented way of functioning with high levels of overlap and low levels 
of active coordination.  Most of these organizations have adopted rules relating 
to professional competence, consumer protection, and the protection of public 
interest; thereby, showing awareness of professional services having 
characteristics similar to experience goods, i.e., significant information 
asymmetries.  Such rules are typically incorporated in a model code of 
ethics, which is intended to inspire domestic professional associations 
when they prepare or revise their code of conduct. Accreditation and 
(continued) education is an emerging area of significant interaction among 
international associations of a given profession and other international 
organizations or entities.  Such initiatives can potentially lead to mutual 
recognition, recognition of equivalent qualifications, and ultimately increased 
mobility.  Thus, significant legal material is produced and epitomizes a range 
of degrees of legal formality; both “soft” and “harder” law seems to be 
generated.  In that sense, international professional associations constitute 
embryonic transnational legal orders.98 
 
          i. Legal Services 
  
The legal sector plays an enabling role in the economy.  It is no 
coincidence that every new Member that joined the WTO in the aftermath 
of the Uruguay Round, including China, inscribed commitments in legal 
services in its schedule of services commitments.  The legal sector has 
experienced steady growth in recent years, following the growth of 
international trade and the development of new fields of practice, notably 
in the area of business and commercial law.  Legal firms around the globe 
are internationalizing their activities to serve better clients engaged in 
activities of a transnational nature.  The profession has become global and 
lawyers are increasingly required to conduct transactions that cross national 
borders and involve several jurisdictions.  It is the demand for legal services 
that can go beyond national borders that drives the increasing interest of the 
legal professionals in the expansion of their possibilities for unhindered 
 
 97. See also Cristopher Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law Practice Means 
Business, 27(2) PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 465 (2008). 
 98. See generally, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence Halliday & Gregory 
Shaffer, eds., 2015). 
28 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:1 
international mobility.  Multi-jurisdictional advice and fully integrated 
services covering all aspects of a business transaction are increasingly 
sought after by multinationals.  Such phenomena lead to important 
structural shifts in the legal market at the national and global levels.99 
Having said this, the regulation of the legal profession is still carried 
out predominantly at the level of political subdivisions rather than at the 
national level.  Thus, authority for admission to the profession and 
professional discipline often is in the hands of local, state or provincial organs, 
be it governmental or professional (in the latter case, through delegation, as 
noted earlier).  Such fragmentation of regulating the legal profession is often 
the result of rent-seeking.100 The superiority of self-regulation in the legal 
profession has been questioned based on competition law grounds at least 
in the OECD countries, whereby a transition towards separate independent 
“umbrella regulators” who focus on the market at the macrolevel (rather 
than the individual service supplier) seems to be taking place.101  
Important initiatives have been taken at the transnational level to 
reduce fragmentation of rules relating, for instance, to corporate structure 
or double deontology (referring to the obligation of foreign lawyers to 
comply with both the home and host country code of conduct).  One of the 
most interesting issues on this score relates to restrictions regarding 
advertising.  For instance, in the host country, contrary to the home 
country, advertising of legal services may be prohibited.  Such rules may 
be applying in a discriminatory manner.  For instance, in Denmark, foreign 
lawyers face restrictions on advertising that do not apply to local lawyers. 
Significant progress has been made under the auspices of the 
International Bar Association (IBA) with respect to better transnational 
regulation of the legal profession worldwide.  The IBA is a federation of 
national bar associations and law societies based in New York.  It is a truly 
international organization with about 200 national professional organizations 
and 40,000 individual lawyers as registered members.  The IBA Council, 
where representatives from Bar Associations sit, is IBA’s governing body.  
According to the constitution of the IBA, the IBA aims, inter alia, to 
(i) establish and maintain relations and exchanges between Bar 
Associations and their members worldwide; (ii) assist in the development 
 
 99. See also Deborah Jones Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010? Empirical 
Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession, MICH. STATE L. REV. 1043 (2015). 
 100. See Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV.  64, 291 (1974). 
 101. See also Alison Hook, Sectoral Study on the Impact of Domestic Regulation on Trade in 
Legal Services, 13 (2007), (OECD/World Bank Sixth Services Experts Meeting on Domestic 
Regulation and Trade in Professional Services). 
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and improvement of the profession’s organization and status worldwide; 
(iii) promote uniformity and definition in appropriate fields of law; and (iv) 
promote the administration of justice under the rule of law globally.102 To 
achieve these objectives, the IBA undertook significant work adopting 
resolutions and producing guidelines related to such diverse areas as ethical 
standards, conflicts of interest, taking of evidence and party representation 
in international arbitration; the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments for collective redress; multidisciplinary practices; money 
laundering; standards and criteria for recognition of lawyers’ qualifications; 
or the regulation of foreign lawyers.103  Notably, two resolutions of the IBA 
on General Principles for the Establishment and Regulation of Foreign 
Lawyers (adopted in June 1998) and the resolution in Support of a System 
of Terminology for Legal Services for the Purposes of International Trade 
Negotiations (adopted in September 2003) provide reference points on the 
regulation of foreign lawyers advocating the adoption of either a full licensing 
approach or a limited licensing approach or an appropriate combination of both 
with a view to facilitating legal practice around the world. 
The IBA International Code of Ethics was first adopted in 1956.  The 
latest edition dates back to 1988.  The code is not binding on the members 
of the IBA and applies to any lawyer of one jurisdiction in relation to his 
contracts with a lawyer of another jurisdiction or to his activities in another 
jurisdiction.  The code includes rules on ethical standards that are common 
to most countries on matters such as honour and dignity, independence, 
courtesy and fairness to colleagues, financial diligence, conflicts of interest, 
contingency fees, unauthorised practice of law, professional liability, 
disclosure of confidential information, confidentiality of lawyer-client 
communications, respect towards the courts, advertisement and solicitation, 
handling, refusal and withdrawal from cases and out of court settlements.  It also 
includes a rule that binds lawyers who undertake work in a jurisdiction where 
they are not full members of the local profession to the ethical rules of the host 
country, as well as to those of their home country.  The IBA may bring incidents 
of alleged violation of the code to the attention of relevant organizations. 
In addition, the IBA adopted a ‘Guide for Establishing and 
Maintaining Complaints and Discipline Procedures’ to assist national 
associations in the creation or revision of their complaints and discipline 
procedures.  The Guide makes a logical link with the Code of Conduct in 
 
 102. See International Bar Association Constitution, art. 1 (May 28, 2011), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=D1E3CF28-BE59-4FC6-96EB-
4E40156C19CE. 
 103. For a list of the IBA resolutions, see IBA guides, rules and other free materials, 
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx.   
30 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:1 
that the implementation of complaints procedures depends on the clarity of 
the rules enshrined in the Code of Conduct.  The Guide emphasizes the 
need for adequately informing the consumers of the possibility of lodging a 
complaint; allowing easy, public access to information relating to 
complaints; setting specific timelines for handling complaints; and giving 
the opportunity to respond to the lawyer concerned.  The Guide envisages a 
disciplinary framework, whereby the complainant has access to a complaint 
handling body, which, if the complaint is well-substantiated, refers the 
matter to a disciplinary tribunal.  Decisions of the latter shall be appealed 
before an appeal tribunal.  All three bodies are to be fair, impartial and 
independent and may, but need not necessarily, contain nonlawyers.  
Thus, the Guide promotes an extra-judicial mechanism that is to run in 
parallel with public courts, but crucially does not require the participation of 
non-lawyers.  For instance, participation of judges or notaries (at least, in those 
jurisdictions where notaries are deemed agents of the public interest) could be 
a more valuable guarantee of independence.104  According to the Guide, the 
following penalties could be imposed to the lawyer: (a) reprimand; (b) fine 
and/or restitution order; (c) suspension or revocation of license to practice; (d) 
additional courses or further education of the respondent; (e) restricting the 
lawyer’s licence to practice. 
With over 200 Bar Associations and several thousand individual 
members, the International Union of Lawyers (UIA) has similar objectives and 
membership.  UIA equally adopted resolutions relating to issues of 
professional conduct, foreign legal practice, professional secrecy and 
multidisciplinary practices.105  The UIA’s ‘Turin Principles of Professional 
Conduct for the Legal Profession on the 21st Century’ of 2002 provide:  
 
C.  Role of and Representation by the Bar 
  
Depending on the country, a Lawyer has the duty or 
the right to be a member of a Bar or Law Society and 
to ensure that the profession is governed by rules laid 
down by the representative bodies of which he or she 
is a member, and that they are observed. 
 
Provided that the Bar observes the principles set out 
 
 104. Cf. Case C-506/04, Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, ¶43-
62, 2006 E.C.R. I-8613, (the Court cast doubts as to the impartiality of a disciplinary body 
which is composed exclusively by lawyers). 
 105. See International Association for Lawyers, Resolutions and Charters, http://www.uianet. 
org/en/documentation/resolutions (last accessed on Apr. 15, 2016). 
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in the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 
endorsed by the UN,106 Lawyers have the duty to 
recognise the Bar’s right to establish such rules and 
to ensure compliance by conforming their conduct to 
the rules laid down by their own Bar and those of the 
other jurisdictions in which they practise. 
 
The UIA has further adopted in 2002 a set of ‘Standards for 
Lawyers Establishing a Legal Practice Outside Their Home Country’ 
which provides, inter alia, for compliance of foreign lawyers with host 
country rules of ethics and implies that the host country regulatory 
authority should, through the registration of the foreign lawyer, have all 
available information to determine and enforce compliance with 
applicable standards. 
 
         i. Engineering Services 
  
Contrary to the legal sector, engineering has been less bothered with 
securing complete regulatory authority.  This is because engineers typically 
work as employees of private companies, notably due to the need for 
significant capital investment.107  However, the emergence of other non-
governmental international professional organizations has influenced 
developments in this profession as well.  The World Federation of 
Engineering Organizations (WFEO) consists of over 90 national and 10 
regional members representing some 20 million engineers.  It has ten 
standing committees hosted in various countries worldwide.  In 2001, the 
WFEO adopted a model code of ethics to define and support the creation of 
similar codes in member institutions.  Interestingly, the Code comes with an 
interpretation of the Code of Ethics.  The Code’s introductory text provided: 
  
These governing principles of the Code of Ethics are 
usually presented either as broad guiding principles of 
an idealistic or inspirational nature, or, alternatively, as 
a detailed and specific set of rules couched in legalistic 
or imperative terms to make them more enforceable.  
Professions that have been given the privilege and 
 
 106. The text refers here to the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the 
8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Havana, Cuba, August 27, September 7, 1990.  
 107. Rostain, supra note 60, at 173. 
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responsibility of self regulation, including the 
engineering profession, have tended to opt for the first 
alternative, espousing sets of underlying principles as 
codes of professional ethics which form the basis and 
framework for responsible professional practice.  
Arising from this context, professional codes of ethics 
have sometimes been incorrectly interpreted as a set of 
“rules” of conduct intended for passive observance.  A 
more appropriate use by practicing professionals is to 
interpret the essence of the underlying principles within 
their daily decision-making situations in a dynamic 
manner, responsive to the need of the situation.  As a 
consequence, a code of professional ethics is more than a 
minimum standard of conduct; rather, it is a set of 
principles which should guide professionals in their daily 
work.  (Emphasis added). 
 
The most recent WFEO Model Code of Ethics confirms the twofold 
objective of a model code of ethics, that is, protect the public, but also the 
engineering practitioners from provisions that may restrain commercial 
activity.  In addition, it identifies four objectives for any code of ethics in 
engineering: integrity, competence, leadership, and sustainability.108  More 
generally, sustainability has become an increasingly important issue for 
WFEO to the extent that a Model Code of Practice for sustainable 
development and environmental stewardship was adopted in September 
2013.  On the occasion of the Paris conference on climate change, WFEO 
reflected on the role of engineers in a low-carbon economy.  At this 
juncture, it adopted a Model Code of Practice on Principles of Climate 
Change Adaptation for Engineers during the WFEO General Assembly in 
December 2015 in Paris.  This Code complements the previous two and 
evolves around principles relating to professional judgment, integration of 
climate information, and guidance on practice.  
Sustainability-related global rules in engineering are growing in 
prominence, notably due to the globalization of supply chains.109 As 
 
 108. For the latest version of the Model Code of the World Federation of Engineering 
Organizations, see http://www.wfeo.org/wp-content/uploads/WFEO_MODEL_CODE_OF_ 
ETHICS_Final.pdf (last accessed on Apr. 22, 2016). 
 109. See also Meredith Miller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Working Conditions in 
the Global Supply Chain – Accountability through Transparency in Private Ordering, in 
THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE – MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 432 
(Jena Martin & Karen Bravo eds., 2016). 
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production is outsourced, leveling the playing field in supplying 
engineering services is necessary, as the recent collapse of the eight-story 
Rana Plaza building dramatically demonstrates.110  Such tragic events also 
emphasize the need for more regular checks by Western investors of facilities, 
buildings and infrastructure that is used for their production, perhaps through 
commissioning engineers from their home countries.  In addition, growing 
internationalization calls for more convergence regarding educational 
standards and professional qualifications.  
Since the 1980s, national institutions and other associations have 
attempted to establish systems for accrediting engineering courses and 
assessing the professional competence of engineers for independent 
practice.  The most well-known examples of this cooperation include the 
Washington Accord, which is a constitutive part of the International 
Engineering Alliance (IEA).  The Washington Accord is an early example 
of a reciprocal agreement that was reached by engineering organisations 
representing Australia, Canada, Ireland, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Malaysia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  In 2014, Sri Lanka and India 
joined the Accord.  The Accord recognises the equivalency of the national 
accreditation mechanisms in these countries and thus graduates in these 
countries are considered as having met the academic requirements for entry 
to the practice of engineering.111 Other parts of the education of engineers 
are covered by the Sydney Accord (engineering technologists or 
incorporated engineers), signed in 2001, and the Dublin Accord 
(engineering technician), signed in 2002. 
Other examples of cooperation include the European Federation of 
National Engineering Organizations (FEANI), the Engineers Mobility Forum 
and the APEC Engineer Monitoring Committee.  These constitute a global 
network working on standards for engineering degrees and professional 
engineering practice.112  For instance, FEANI adopted standards and rules 
relating to the assessment of competence of professional engineers with a 
view to increase mobility of engineers in Europe.  Notably the Engineers 
Mobility Forum agreement created the framework for the establishment of 
an international standard of competence for professional engineering.  This 
 
 110. Jim Yardley, Justice Still Elusive in Factory Disasters in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2013. 
 111. See Washington Accord, IEA, http://www.ieagreements.org/Washington-Accord/ (last 
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Forum was repealed by the International Professional Engineers Agreement 
(IPEA), a multinational, open agreement with the same critical objective as 
the previous Forum.113  The standard applied is the same as the APEC 
Engineer Agreement.  However, non-APEC members, such as the United 
Kingdom or Ireland, are parties to the IPEA.  WFEO, in turn, has been 
working on the preparation of a policy on accreditation of courses and 
mobility of engineering professionals, which would complement the above-
mentioned initiatives. 
There are other international organizations that are concurrently active in 
promoting the engineering profession.  Most notably, the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which has over 400,000 members in 160 
countries and covers electrical and electronics engineers, or the International 
Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), which focuses entirely on 
consulting firms.  The World Council of Civil Engineers focuses on civil 
engineers who represent around 50 percent of all engineering organizations 
worldwide.  The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), although established in the 
UK, represents about 90,000 members from more than 160 countries worldwide. 
One interesting aspect of the above-mentioned international initiatives 
is that they have adopted codes of conduct, which, other than making 
reference to education, competence and integrity of the engineers, 
underscore the importance of combating corruption in the profession, 
particularly in the materialization of construction projects.  For instance, 
FIDIC has prepared and encourages the implementation of an ‘Integrity 
Management System’, focusing on preventive action to fight corruption. 
Guidelines in this regard were first adopted in 2001.  In 2006, FIDIC 
adopted similar guidelines specific to government procurement.  In 2011, 
the first edition of policies and principles regarding the FIDIC Integrity 
Management System (FIMS) was published.114  
ICE also adopted a Code of Professional Conduct, violation of 
which may lead to disciplinary action against a given member.  The ICE 
disciplinary mechanism includes the Professional Conduct Panel and the 
Disciplinary Board.  The former is in charge of investigating all 
allegations against ICE Members that are accused of inappropriate 
conduct.  Serious cases are to be forwarded to the Disciplinary Board 
for formal adjudication. According to By-law 40, the Disciplinary 
Board can impose the following sanctions: compliance with certain 
requirements regarding the member’s future professional or business 
 
 113. IEA CONST., available at http://www.ieagreements.org/Agreement-Constitutions-
Version-1.pdf. 
 114. See also INT’L FED’N OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, http://fidic.org/node/777 (last visited 
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conduct; fines up to a maximum of £2,000; admonition; severe reprimand; 
suspension; and expulsion.  According to By-law 41, appeal to an independent 
tribunal is possible in theory under certain circumstances. 
 
         ii. Architectural Services 
  
The International Union of Architects (UIA) consists of national 
associations from 130 countries and territories.  It is a federation of 
national professional organizations called Member Sections.  The UIA 
maintains an open electronic database with information about the industry 
in each Member Section and in order to assist those architects who 
practice their profession at the international level.  In this respect, the 
UIA has been quite active in the field of facilitating movement of 
architects at the international level.  In 1999, the UIA General Assembly 
unanimously agreed on an Accord on Recommended International 
Standards of Professionalism in Architectural Practice and a set of 
Recommended Guidelines, which offer a basis for mutual recognition of 
architectural competences at the international level.115 In addition, the 
UIA has developed, jointly with UNESCO, a Charter for Architectural 
Education, which sets out broad minimum standards.116 According to 
UIA, the latter should be regarded as the minimum criteria for 
architectural education.  
Previously, the UIA had adopted an International Code of Ethics on 
Consulting Services, which should ostensibly constitute “the common 
standard of conduct for all professionals performing consulting services 
in all nations.”  Member Sections are encouraged to introduce into their 
own codes of ethics the recommended Accord Guidelines mentioned 
earlier and a requirement that their members adhere to the codes of ethics 
in force in the host country, provided that they are not prohibited by 
international law or the home country laws.  Indeed, Article 9 of the Code 
provides that the architect delivering professional services abroad shall 
abide by the host country’s professional regulation laws and adhere to the 
code of ethics that domestic professionals apply.  Interestingly, in its 
Article 10, the Code provides: 
 
(1) The common objectives of all professional 
organizations are to establish and promote the highest 
 
 115. Most recently revised in 2014, the Accord is available at:  http://www.uia.archi/sites 
/default/files/AIAS075164.pdf (last accessed on May 2, 2016).   
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standards of ethical conduct and excellence in the 
practice of the professions, to regulate the professional 
conduct of the members of the professions and to 
cooperate with their allied professional organizations. 
 
(2) In line with the foregoing objectives, it shall be 
mandatory upon a professional organization to take 
appropriate action on any formal complaint for unethical 
conduct filed against any member of its profession by a co-
professional, a client, a professional organization or a 
government regardless of the residence of the 
complainant.  (Emphasis added). 
 
At the national level, the Accord encourages the creation of 
professional bodies if they do not exist.  It further underlines the 
importance for these bodies to adhere to the UIA international standards, 
the UNESCO-UIA requirements, and the UIA Code of Ethics.  Such bodies 
should be governed in an open and transparent manner and are expected to 
promote the interests of consumers, architects, and the general public.  
The Accord and Recommended Guidelines are deemed nonbinding 
documents for the consideration of the individual national Member 
Sections, and the UIA cannot enforce those documents.  However, their 
influence is apparent.  For instance, Korea expanded the required 
architectural education from four to five years; the Architects’ Council of Europe 
revised their recommended Code of Ethics based on the UIA mode; and the 
MRA relating to architects under NAFTA uses the definition of architect 
included in the UIA Accord.117  In addition, UIA was one of the few 
international professional associations to submit a proposal for a WTO GATS 
Annex on Domestic Regulation to allow for the dismantlement of unnecessarily 
excessive barriers to trade in professional/architectural services.118  
 
V. Private Enforcement and Judicial Review  
 
Private enforcement has been a pervasive feature of the existing social 
and economic system for several decades.  Whereas the State assists by 
establishing and maintaining a court system, the most important part of 
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enforcement is informal, also driven by the “latent threat of withdrawing 
future business from the violator.”119 Enforcement of private rules in 
professional services reveals an interaction of bodies, be it public, private 
or hybrid.  In professional services in which self-regulation has 
traditionally prevailed, such as the legal profession, the creation of 
disciplinary bodies consisting mainly of fellow professionals is common.  
It is in a second step and in more significant cases of professional 
misconduct that the participation of a “public authority” representative, 
such as a judge, occurs.  In other cases, referral of the entire case to a public 
court may be stipulated in the statute of a given professional organization.  For 
instance, the rules of a given professional association may offer the possibility of 
appeal to ordinary courts against certain decisions made by disciplinary bodies of 
the association.  In other cases, notably claims raised by consumers, it is public 
courts that will be deciding on issues of fault and liability.  Finally, once the 
remedy of having recourse to the disciplinary bodies of a given professional 
association is exhausted, recourse to the ordinary judicial system is always open 
for the person negatively affected.  As mentioned earlier in the case of the UK, 
the State in certain cases may prefer to delegate the most insignificant cases to 
special agencies that oversee the work and activities of the professional bodies. 
Initially regarded as an intervention in the matters of professional 
associations, judicial review of decisions by private professional associations 
became a standard procedure in case of continued complaints. This can happen 
even after the exhaustion of disciplinary processes within a given professional 
association, notably with regard to the imposition of sanctions and the admission 
to the profession.  In both cases, the notion of public interest and antitrust-related 
considerations are important issues for the State to keep an eye on.  Judicial 
review in this case would entail a balance between incommensurables whereby 
judges ultimately make implicit value judgments. 
When a given situation is treated by the disciplinary body of a given 
professional association, it seems that the enforcement pyramid becomes 
relevant.120  Regulatory approaches would begin at the bottom of the pyramid for 
low-profile cases necessitating a warning or soft forms of notice, and escalate 
towards the imposition of fines and/or incapacitation in response to compliance 
failures.  According to Ayres and Braithwaite,121 governments should allow self-
regulation to industries in the first instance, but the State should move on through 
enforced self-regulation to command regulation with (discretionary and 
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subsequently with nondiscretionary) punishment if the goals are not met.  Thus, 
the regulator shall be able to move up and down the pyramid or even recover the 
regulatory power that had been delegated to a professional association depending 
on the gravity of the situation.  This last element can also be part of a meta-
regulation approach, whereby governmental authorities deliberately seek to 
induce private bodies to develop their internal self-regulatory responses to 
challenges.122  However, an overemphasis on punitive strategies can render 
voluntary compliance at the bottom of the pyramid impossible.123 
 
A. Legal Services 
  
Private enforcement in the legal profession entails, for the most part, 
the implementation of legal ethics rules against misconduct or fraudulent 
and deceptive practices of lawyers.  Typically, codes of ethics would entail 
a series of sanctions, which, depending on the type of behaviour and 
severity of the offense, would escalate up to the level of indefinite 
expulsion from the Bar.  Sanctions more often than not include: admonition, 
reprimand, censure, suspension from practice, or disbarment. Admonition is 
usually a private discipline, whereas reprimand can be private or public.  
Censure, suspension and disbarment are public disciplinary sanctions. 
In the United States, self-regulation in the legal profession co-exists 
with state regulation.  Codes of ethics are typically enforced by the 
respective state’s supreme courts, which have acted as the ultimate 
gatekeepers.  Thus, rules of professional conduct in the legal profession are 
in the end considered as rules of the supreme court of a given state, and 
thus applied under the aegis of the state judiciary.124  However, in practice, 
such rules have been prepared by the state bar and are typically based on 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct set out by the American Bar 
Association (ABA).  In several states, disbarment, which is the most severe 
sanction, can be decided only by the state’s supreme court.125  
Nonetheless, the rest of the sanctions have been traditionally enforced 
by disciplinary agencies that either operate within the judicial branch or are 
part of the state bars.  Thus, for some time, state bars were in charge of 
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conducting investigations, holding hearings and imposing a range of 
disciplines.  This led to the proceedings becoming confidential, somehow 
implying that there was no public interest involved in cases brought against 
misbehaving lawyers.  
However, over the years it became clear that the bars largely failed to 
run effective disciplinary mechanisms, with more than 90 percent of 
complaints against lawyers being dismissed – sometimes without any 
investigation.126  In addition, corporate lawyers became so intertwined with 
business that they became subject to federal regulation in important areas 
such as securities or taxation.  In the case of corporate practice, ethics 
regulation is federalized.127  In such areas of significant federal interest, 
federal regulation treats corporate lawyers as one of a class of similar 
service providers.128 
Thus, more open mechanisms have emerged in which, nonetheless, 
lawyers, and less the organized state bars, continued to play an essential 
role.  For instance, in New Jersey, legal ethics issues will first be raised 
with one of the seventeen district ethics committees around that state.129 
Such committees are composed of three members, two of whom are 
lawyers.  Decisions of the committees and the Office of Attorney Ethics 
can be reviewed before the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) of the 
supreme court of New Jersey, which conducts a de novo review.  The DRB 
consists of nine members appointed by the supreme court.130  Five of them are 
attorneys, one member is a retired judge and the remaining three members are 
nonlawyer, public members.  The Board’s decision must be reviewed by the 
state’s supreme court only in the case of a decision recommending disbarment.  
According to Rule 1:20-16(b) of the New Jersey Court Rules 
Governing Attorney Discipline, in all forms of discipline other than 
disbarment, the recommendation of the Board becomes final on entry of an 
order by the supreme court, unless the latter grants one of the parties leave 
to appeal.  The state’s supreme court decision can be appealed before the 
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United States Supreme Court.  Disciplinary proceedings are public, but all 
fee arbitration proceedings are confidential.131  A Random Audit 
Compliance Programme is also pursued, which allows the identification of 
otherwise unknown attorney misconduct. 
The state’s supreme court is free to follow its own argumentation, 
whereas the views of the bodies previously dealing with a given case 
merely constitute recommendations.  For instance, in Zauderer, the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s claimant that his due process 
rights were violated because the Ohio Supreme Court relied on a theory 
that was different from the one brought forward by the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline or the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel.  The United States Supreme Court emphasized that, under the law 
of Ohio, the Board has no authority to impose discipline, but simply 
recommend discipline to the state’s supreme court, which is the ultimate 
authority responsible for bar discipline according to the Ohio state 
constitution (and, obviously under all state constitutions).132  
As an alternative to civil litigation, in the state of New Jersey, the 
possibility of fee arbitration is offered when there is disagreement with 
respect to fees.  This programme handled more than 1,795 cases involving 
more than $13 million in legal fees in 2014.133 If parties choose this option 
instead of civil litigation, they are presumed as bound by the decision of the 
arbitrators.  Just as with the DRB, most members in this institution are still 
attorneys.  Typically, the fee arbitrator committee will consist of three 
lawyers or two lawyers and one public member. 
Although important steps were made to improve the openness of 
disciplinary mechanisms, the situation is still regarded as unsatisfactory in 
several States.134  Lawyer discipline mechanisms have been criticized for 
their lack of transparency at least since the 1970s and this has led to an 
increased involvement of the judicial branch as a guarantee of 
independence.  The ABA McKay Commission, when examining the lawyer 
discipline mechanisms, found that “the Commission is convinced that 
secrecy in discipline proceedings continues to be the greatest single source 
of public distrust of lawyer disciplinary systems.”135  In addition, in several 
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cases, consumers are not adequately informed of recidivists, who may 
actually have been sanctioned several times before they are disbarred, if at 
all.  Indeed, in New Jersey, several lawyers have received public discipline 
in more than one instance.136  In Louisiana, a study suggested that between 1975 
and 2000, 85 percent of the disbarred lawyers who applied for reinstatement 
succeeded and 44 percent of those lawyers were subsequently disciplined.137 
Furthermore, it appears that sanctions are imposed in an unbalanced manner in 
that solo or small-firm lawyers are disproportionately prosecuted. 
Nowadays, important steps towards increased transparency were 
made, with an enhanced involvement of the state judiciary.  In California, 
for instance, the State Bar investigates complaints of attorney misconduct 
and, if necessary, files formal charges with the State Bar Court.  This court 
consists of independent professional judges and no attorneys are involved. 
The State Bar Court has the power to discipline lawyers for lesser offenses 
and recommend to the State’s Supreme Court suspension or disbarment for 
more serious crimes.  Again, the extent to which the disciplinary system is 
public varies among states.  Complaints against lawyers in Florida, New 
Hampshire, Oregon and West Virginia are treated as a matter of public record.  
In 2009, over 88,000 complaints were received by the state 
disciplinary agencies.  However, the majority of the complaints filed were 
dismissed after investigation during the same period.138 More than 2,000 
lawyers were privately sanctioned, whereas the number of lawyers who 
were publicly sanctioned was slightly below 5,000.  Thus, sanctions have 
become increasingly public, thereby serving an important function of 
transparency, openness, and consumer protection from laggards.  However, 
downsides are also present in that reputation costs can be high, notably for 
lawyers who in the end were not disciplined.139 
Many times, disciplinary proceedings run in parallel with civil 
litigation or criminal proceedings.  For instance, In the Matter of Marc F. 
Desidario, the New Jersey Supreme Court disbarred Mr.  Desiderio as a 
result of his criminal conviction by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California.  Mr. Desidario was accused of money 
laundering, aiming to conceal the operations of a substantial marijuana 
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distribution organization.  The New Jersey Supreme Court temporarily 
suspended the attorney, but only after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
commit money laundering before the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida.140 
In Ohralik, a case that was subsequently handled by the United States 
Supreme Court,141 at stake was the behaviour of an Ohio lawyer, who 
managed, through face-to-face solicitation of two car accident victims, to 
sign contingent-fee arrangements with them.  Eventually, both victims 
discharged the attorney, but he succeeded in obtaining a share of the 
driver’s insurance recovery in settlement of his lawsuit against them for 
breach of contract.  Later, both victims filed grievances with the Ohio State 
Bar Association for violation of the rules prohibiting unsolicited 
recommendation or acceptance of employment for members of the Bar.142 
The Bar’s grievance committee recommended a public reprimand, which 
was later endorsed by the Disciplinary Board of the Ohio Supreme Court. 
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Board’s findings, but 
increased the Board’s recommended sanction of a public reprimand to an 
indefinite suspension. 
In Europe, the structure of disciplinary mechanisms varies.  The 
CCBE recommends that any disciplinary proceedings in the legal 
profession be independent vis-à-vis state authorities.  Rather, the primary 
responsibility of the conduct of disciplinary proceedings should preferably 
lie with the Bar or the Law Society.  Having said this, the State may set the 
framework within which disciplinary proceedings should function.143 
In England and Wales, the Legal Services Act of 2007 constitutes a 
major overhaul of the regulation of the legal profession and a dramatic 
transformation of the self-regulatory model.  The Act permits, inter alia, 
nonlawyers to invest in law firms.  Thus, UK-based firms can seek outside 
capital.  In addition, the Act allows the creation of Alternative Business 
Structures (ABS),144 alias multidisciplinary practices, whereby lawyers can 
join forces with nonlawyers such as accountants or tax consultants.145  By 
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2014, over 250 ABSs were licensed in the UK, accounting for a significant 
share in the legal market.146  
In this new regulatory framework, the Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(SRA), established in 2007, is the independent regulatory body of the Law 
Society of England and Wales.  The new SRA Code of Conduct, adopting 
an outcomes-focused regulatory approach, came into force in 2011. 
According to the new framework, all authorized legal firms in the UK will 
need to appoint compliance officers for legal practice (COLPs, must be 
qualified lawyers) and for finance and administration (COFAs, not 
necessarily lawyers), who will be responsible for risk management and 
proper governance.  
In principle, the SRA is the first body that will take up a complaint of 
misconduct against a solicitor.147  The SRA has vague standards as to 
whether decisions against solicitors will be published or not, depending on 
whether publication promotes the public interest (which the SRA decides 
unilaterally upon).  Published decisions include: decisions to fine or 
rebuke, decisions to prosecute at the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 
(SDT), decisions to control how a firm or an individual practices, decisions 
to close a practice, and agreed outcomes with firms or individuals.  
The SDT is constituted as a Statutory Tribunal under the UK 
Solicitors Act 1974.  Prosecution to the SDT is done by the SRA and is 
necessary in severe cases such as striking a solicitor from the roll of 
solicitors.  The SDT also decides for reinstatements, i.e. restorations to the 
roll of solicitors.  It has 53 members, 34 of which are solicitors.  These 
solicitors should have no connection with the SRA.  Publication of 
outcomes comes late in the procedure.  Decisions of the SRA to prosecute 
will be published only when the SDT has certified that there is a case to 
answer.  Orders delivered by the SDT can be appealed before the High 
Court.  The SRA can also appeal against a decision by the SDT.  
For instance, In the Matter of Pawan Vikram Sharma,148 at stake was 
the misconduct of Mr. Sharma who, inter alia, forged signatures on five 
occasions during a transaction and sent on his firm’s letterheaded paper to 
facilitate a personal transaction.  Despite admitting that the allegations were 
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true, Mr. Sharma denied that he had acted fraudulently or dishonestly.  The 
SDT initially found that, despite Mr. Sharma’s dishonesty, the fact that no 
public harm occurred and Mr. Sharma was the beneficial owner of 100 percent 
of the shares in the company on behalf of which he wrote on the firm’s 
letterhead made this case exceptional.  For these reasons, the SDT disciplined 
Mr. Sharma with a three-year suspension from practice as a solicitor.  
The SRA believed this sanction to be excessively lenient and therefore 
appealed before the High Court arguing that the appropriate sanction in this 
case would be disbarment.149  The High Court considered the Salsbury v. 
Law Society150 test to find that it was not applicable in the end.  Under the 
circumstances of the case at issue, dishonesty from a solicitor could not be 
permissible, as Mr. Sharma had repeatedly acted dishonestly and no 
exceptional circumstances could justify such behaviour.  Thus, the High 
Court concluded that a striking-off order from the roll was appropriate. 
The CJEU has also reviewed manifold decisions by professional 
bodies to protect the fundamental freedoms in accordance with the treaties, 
notably the freedom of establishment set out in Article 49 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the freedom to provide 
services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU.  Recognizing that the private bodies 
can hamper market access and that the rules of free movement can have 
horizontal effect, that is, they can be invoked against nongovernmental bodies 
and individuals,151 the CJEU revolutionized the interpretation of the EU Treaties.  
In Wilson, for instance, at issue was the Luxembourg Conseil d’Ordre 
(Bar Council) refusal to register Mr. Wilson in the Bar Register, as the Bar 
Council was unable to determine Mr. Wilson’s language knowledge.  Mr. 
Wilson decided not to appeal before the Bar’s Disciplinary and 
Administrative Committee, but to the Administrative Court.  The latter, 
however, found that it had no jurisdiction.  Subsequently, Mr. Wilson 
appealed to the Higher Administrative Court, which decided to seek a 
preliminary ruling by the CJEU.  Mr. Wilson challenged the independence 
of the disciplinary bodies of the Bar to substantiate his claim that the 
disciplinary proceedings violated the Directive 98/5 requiring that refusals 
of registration to the Bar be reviewed by a court of tribunal as defined by 
EU law.  The CJEU found that the condition of independence was not met. 
According to the CJEU:152 
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The guarantees of independence and impartiality require 
rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body 
and the appointment, length of service and the grounds for 
abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order 
to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals 
as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and 
its neutrality with respect to the interests before it . . . 
 
In this case, the composition of the Disciplinary and 
Administrative Committee . . . is characterised by the 
exclusive presence of lawyers of Luxembourg nationality. . . 
 
As regards the Disciplinary and Administrative Appeals 
Committee, the amendment made . . . confers overriding 
influence on the assessors, who must be registered on the 
same list and presented by the Bar Councils of each of the 
Bar Associations referred to in the preceding paragraph of 
this judgment, as compared with the professional magistrates. 
 
. . .the Bar Council, whose members . . . are lawyers 
registered in List I of the Bar Register, thus has its decisions 
refusing registration of a European lawyer reviewed at first 
instance by a body composed exclusively of lawyers 
registered on the same list and on appeal by a body 
composed for the most part of such lawyers. 
 
In those circumstances, a European lawyer whose 
registration on List IV of the Bar Register has been refused 
by the Bar Council has legitimate grounds for concern that 
either all or the majority, as the case may be, of the 
members of those bodies have a common interest contrary 
to his own, that is, to confirm a decision to remove from the 
market a competitor who has obtained his professional 
qualification in another Member State, and for suspecting 
that the balance of interests concerned would be upset. . . 
 
Thus, the Court was concerned about the impartiality of such private 
enforcement bodies.  Another element weighing against the Luxembourg Bar 
was that subsequent judicial review by the domestic Supreme Court was limited 
to issues of law according to the relevant legislation.  However, in such cases, 
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courts should have full jurisdiction to make an independent, de novo review.153 
As private enforcement bodies de facto exercise judicial functions, the 
CJEU has accepted early on that they can have recourse to the preliminary 
reference mechanism in case of doubt as to the interpretation of EU law.  In 
Broekmeulen, the CJEU had to examine a refusal of the General 
Practitioners Registration Committee, a body established by the Royal 
Netherlands Society for the Promotion of Medicine, to register as general 
practitioner a doctor who obtained his diploma in Belgium.  
In that case, interestingly, the Appeals Committee of the private body 
sought a preliminary ruling by the CJEU.  As a preliminary issue touching 
upon the admissibility of the application, the CJEU had to decide whether 
the Committee could come under the definition of a tribunal or court.  The 
CJEU acknowledged that, in the case at issue, the private body was fairly 
powerful and access to ordinary courts was in fact nonexistent.  The CJEU 
held that the Appeals Committee must be regarded as a court or tribunal and 
therefore have access to the preliminary ruling proceedings of the CJEU 
relating to the interpretation of EU law.  Two elements weighed heavily in the 
minds of the judges: first, that this body operates with the consent and 
cooperation of the public authorities; and second, that it delivers decisions 
that are in fact recognized as final after an adversarial procedure.154 
 
B. Engineering 
  
Codes of ethics for the engineering profession in the US existed since 
the beginning of the twentieth century and initially aimed to regulate the 
professional ethos.  Few years later, European engineering associations, 
notably in Germany (e.g. DIN, VDI), have started becoming powerful and 
produced legally binding rules for technological design.  In the United States, 
regulation and a fortiori enforcement against misconduct of engineers is rather 
state-centered.  This implies that mobility already at the federal level can be 
challenging, notably as in some States generic licenses are issued, while in 
others, licenses for specific disciplines of engineering (for instance, civil 
engineering or mechanical engineering) are delivered.  Exams are typically 
organized by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and 
Surveying (NCEES) to which each state’s engineering board is represented.   
In some states, a board may be responsible for identifying misconduct 
in engineering and related professions, such as architecture.  Thus, in 
Missouri, the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, and 
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Professional Land Surveyors and Landscape Architects are in charge of 
ensuring the adherence to the relevant code of conduct.  In a recent case, 
the issue was whether a licensed professional engineer, Mr. Bird, should be 
disciplined because he affixed his seal to building plans that were prepared 
in large part by a licensed architect whose work was not done under the 
engineer’s immediate personal supervision as the relevant Board 
regulations required.155  Mr. Bird agreed to complete plans and drawings 
for a commercial building project for Landmark Builders of Blue Springs 
after the architect’s refusal to complete them.  Landmark had previously 
refused to pay an additional fee to the architect for the completion of the 
drawings.  The revision of the drawings was necessary because the 
Planning Commission rejected them.  The Administrative Hearing 
Committee (AHC), before which the Board filed a complaint, found that 
Mr. Bird’s behaviour was faulty and subject to discipline because he did 
not supervise the prior work of the architect.  The Board subsequently 
suspended Mr. Bird for three years to be followed by a year of probation.  
Mr. Bird asked for a review before the Cole County Circuit Court which, 
after finding serious errors in the AHC’ decision, remanded rehearing.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Bird’s appeal. 
Ultimately, the matter was brought before the Missouri Supreme Court.156 
The Court started by underscoring the breadth of its judicial review: “the 
Court’s inquiry may extend to a determination of whether the action of the 
agency is in violation of constitutional provisions, is in excess of the 
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, is unsupported by competent 
and substantial evidence upon the whole record, is, for any other reason, 
unauthorized by law, is made upon unlawful procedure or without a fair trial, is 
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or involves an abuse of discretion.”  
The Court went on to hold that the purpose of professional regulation 
is the protection of the public and not of the licensees.  Therefore, any 
financial losses or nullification of property interest of the architect are 
irrelevant.  Rather, the regulations at issue do nothing more than impose an 
affirmative duty on licensees to ensure the quality of the work they 
complete and to accept personal responsibility for documents they seal, a 
duty that Mr. Bird actually fulfilled, just as he assumed full responsibility 
for the entire project.  Indeed, the ultimate purpose of the regulations was 
to assign personal liability upon professionals in the case of defect.  For 
these reasons, the Court reversed the AHC decision and cleared Mr. Bird. 
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Thus, judicial review against decisions by professional disciplinary 
bodies can be scrutinized thoroughly when the matter at issue pertains to 
the legal interpretation of professional regulations.  As the Missouri 
Supreme Court put it in Bird: “Occupational licensing boards deserve 
deference only in cases that require technical expertise in their respective 
fields.”  Under this spectrum, the role of judicial review shall be regarded 
as a complementary one, providing guidance on legal questions, where the 
professional bodies lack expertise. 
Few years earlier, in Duncan v. Missouri Board for Architects, 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, at issue was a failure by a 
certified engineer to review and check plans and drawings for which the 
engineer was legally responsible.  The Missouri Court of Appeals was 
called upon to decide on a case whereby the license of a supervising 
engineer was revoked because he affixed his seal to structural drawings that 
were the basis for the fabricator’s shop drawings that provided for a defective 
design.157 More specifically, because of the defective design, the second and 
fourth floor walkways of Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City collapsed in 
1981, leading to the death of 114 people and injuring at least another 186 
people.158  In the aftermath of this tragedy, the Board sought to discipline the 
professionals responsible for this project, including Mr. Duncan.  
The AHC found several instances of gross negligence and held that 
the licenses of the professionals accused had to be suspended or revoked. 
The Board ultimately ordered the revocation of all licenses; this decision 
was affirmed by the trial court and the Missouri Court of Appeals.  The 
Court confirmed that the thrust of the regulations at issue was professional 
accountability by a specific individual certified engineer to protect the 
public.  The rules relating to seal suggest that the responsibility imposed on 
engineers for the entire project and all documents connected herewith is 
full and non-delegable, unless a disclaimer is explicitly used.  This is what 
the engineer assumes responsibility for in exchange for the right to practice 
the engineering profession.159  It bears mentioning that in this case none of 
the engineers involved were convicted of criminal negligence. 
The National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) has also 
adopted a code of ethics for engineers.160  The Board of Ethical Review is 
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composed of seven licensed engineers.  Its mission is, inter alia, to render 
opinions as to the interpretation of the Code of Ethics.  However, the Code 
does not establish a disciplinary mechanism and thus the decisions have an 
advisory nature. 
In Ireland, the Institution of Engineers of Ireland (Engineers Ireland) 
adopted a Code of Ethics that was last revised in 2009.  An Ethics and 
Disciplinary Board is the standing committee in charge of the enforcement 
of the code.  In substantiated cases, an Investigative and Disciplinary Panel 
deals with a specific complaint.  The Ethics Board is composed of sixteen 
members where up to four persons are not members of the engineering 
profession.  Proceedings of the Board, Panel, Council and Appeal Board 
are private.  Reprimand, suspension, or exclusion from membership are the 
most important sanctions that the Panel can impose.  Any suspension or 
erasure from Engineers Ireland is to be published in the Engineers Journal. 
Appeals can be lodged with the three-member Appeal Board, where one 
barrister of the Supreme Court also participates. 
Self-regulation in engineering can vary depending on the jurisdiction. 
In certain cases, a private regime exists in parallel with a public (not 
necessarily competing) one, but members of the private regime are only 
bound by the former.  More interestingly, courts may be asked to establish 
a hierarchy among potentially applicable and thus conflicting norms.  In 
Ontario, a question was raised as to the effects of the new Building Code 
Act (BCA) on the otherwise qualified architects and engineers.  In 
Association of Professional Engineers (Ontario) v Ontario (Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
(Divisional Court) found that professional architects and engineers were 
not subject to the BCA and Building Code.  Only through legislation could 
one envisage parallel regulation of competence and professional integrity. 
According to the Court, the BCA’s objective was not to advance public 
safety, but rather to intrude on the exclusive mandate of the Association of 
Professional Engineers (Ontario) and the Ontario Association of Architects 
to qualify, govern, and discipline their members. 
When it comes to the professions of architect and engineer, the CJEU 
has notably been solicited in cases relating to the recognition of 
professional qualifications (or, rather, the absence thereof).  This has been 
the case for various professions over the years, including lawyers.  Thus, 
settled case law suggests that domestic competent authorities are required 
to take into account the knowledge, diplomas, certificates, qualifications 
and experience already recognized or acquired in another EU MS, and give 
adequate reasons in case of nonrecognition, as well as allow for access to 
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an effective remedy.161  Of course, contrary to the profession of engineer, 
architects in the European Union benefit from an automatic recognition 
regime, along with a limited number of other professionals such as 
midwives, doctors, or pharmacists.162  
Thus, in professions where no automatic recognition can take place, 
professionals that are negatively affected by the discretionary powers of the 
relevant regulatory body in the host country have to be able to have access 
to independent review of the decision of that body.  Many times, only 
public courts can ensure such review as a last resort. 
  
C. Architecture 
  
In the US, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) agreed on a 
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct already at the beginning of the 
20th century.  It was most recently amended in 2012.  The Code contains 
rules of conduct that are mandatory, as well as canons (or ethical standards), 
which are nonbinding rules.  Failure to comply with the Code’s rules of 
conduct constitutes grounds for disciplinary action by the National Ethics 
Council (NEC).163 The NEC is composed of seven members appointed by the 
AIA Board of Directors and can impose the following sanctions: (a) 
admonition; (b) censure; (c) suspension of membership for a period of time; 
and (d) termination of membership.  In addition to decision, NEC also 
delivers advisory opinions.  Proceedings are confidential, as is the 
discipline of admonition.  All other sanctions are public.  Decisions to 
terminate membership in particular, are to be considered by the Executive 
Committee, which, if approved, shall be reviewed by the Board, which is 
the supreme body deciding about this sanction.  Common ethics violations 
include: attribution of credit (that is, stating or giving proper credit for 
project involvement); accurate representation of qualifications; attainment 
and provision of examples of work; and basic honesty.164 
In its 90-12 decision of June 22, 1992, the NEC had to deal with a 
claim against an architect who made false statements about the size and 
composition of his firm and the experience and professional qualifications 
of the employees of the firm, thereby violating certain rules of the AIA 
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Code of Ethics.  Architect A’s objective was to receive a rather specialized 
commission by submitting information that would give him a comparative 
advantage vis-à-vis other firms.  Interestingly, architect A claimed that the 
preparation of the firm brochure was the responsibility of the other 
principal of the firm, who was not an AIA member, and thus was not bound 
by the Code.  The NEC was not convinced and instead submitted that 
architect A should have been aware of the untruthfulness of the information 
presented to the interview committee and underscored Members’ responsibility 
for “what goes on in their firms.”  Because misrepresentations were intentional 
and due to the lack of professionalism from the side of architect A, the NEC 
imposed the penalty of censure.  The decision was appealed to the AIA 
Executive Committee, which considered the sanction appropriate.  In the 
aftermath of the decision, architect A resigned his AIA membership.  
More recently, in October 2009, the NEC had to deal with a complaint 
brought against an architect who was accused of ignoring the effects that 
her proposed design would have on adjoining property owned by the 
complainants and of not disclosing information that would enable the 
complainants to consent or to act to protect their interests.  In addition, the 
architect failed to notify the authorities of the unsafe and improper activity 
of her clients.  In its decision 2006-21,165 the NEC found that the architect 
violated the rule prohibiting wanton disregard of the rights of others. 
According to NEC case law, wanton disregard entails an action taken in 
disregard of a “high degree of risk that the Complainant would be 
adversely affected” and that risk “is apparent or would be apparent to a 
reasonable person.”  The NEC further found that, in effect, the architect 
failed to resolve the matter or notify the competent authorities although she 
was aware of unsafe and improper activity.  Because of this and other 
violations of the AIA Code, the NEC imposed the penalty of suspension of 
AIA membership for three years. 
In Australia, Members of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects 
(RAIA) can be subject to the disciplinary mechanism of the association if 
they fail to abide by the RAIA’s rules of conduct.  The Memorandum of 
Association of the RAIA provides that a Professional Conduct Tribunal 
shall examine any complaint for misconduct against an Australian 
architect.  The Tribunal is comprised of fellows of the RAIA of at least 10 
years standing, but it can also include a lawyer.  The Tribunal can impose 
the following sanctions: (private) reprimand, specific professional training 
for a period determined by the RAIA Council, suspension of membership 
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not exceeding two years, and expulsion of membership.  Arbitration is also 
offered as a substitute to appeal mechanisms.  Reinstatement is always 
possible, but, in the case of expulsion, at least three years after the decision 
by the RAIA Council. 
In the United Kingdom, the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) is 
the disciplinary tribunal that hears claims of inappropriate professional 
conduct and incompetence against architects.  The PCC is chaired by a 
solicitor nominated by the Law Society; an architect and one lay member 
will typically complete the three-member PCC whose hearings are public. 
The PCC can issue reprimands, impose fines, suspend or expel an architect 
of the Register.  The Architects Act 1997 requires the publication of the 
name and offense of those architects who have been found guilty.  
In the Matter of Derrick Arthur Matthews, the PCC decided to erase 
from its Register an architect who failed to properly manage his finances, 
gave misleading information to be readmitted to the Register, and had 
inadequate professional indemnity insurance coverage.  Sanctions can also 
be imposed when the complaint is not directly based on the architect’s 
professional competence.  For instance, In the Matter of Clive Wille, the 
PCC decided that expulsion was the appropriate sanction for an architect 
who had several personal problems (e.g., properly dealing with stress; 
controlling violent tendencies) that affected his fitness to practice.  The 
PCC left the possibility for reinstatement open after two years.166 
According to the relevant rules of procedure,167 individuals negatively 
affected by a decision of the Investigations Panel not willing to refer a 
matter to the PCC can request a third-party independent review. 
Alternatively, recourse to ordinary judicial proceedings is possible. 
Judicial review of decisions of private enforcement mechanisms by 
the ordinary courts appears to be fairly deferential and marginal, thereby 
accepting at least implicitly the expertise of the disciplinary mechanisms of 
the professional associations, but also the importance of legal certainty 
when egregious errors are absent.  For instance, in Nye v. Ohio Board Of 
Examiners of Architects, the Court of Appeals of the Ohio Tenth Appellate 
District had to examine an appeal against a judgment by the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas to affirm an order by the Ohio Board of 
Examiners of Architects to revoke the certificate of qualification of an 
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architect to practice architecture.168  In proceedings unrelated to this case, 
the architect had admitted to fraud, fraudulent transfers and conduct 
preventing the discharge of debt under the bankruptcy code through a 
settlement agreement that he concluded with the complainant, the Redeemer 
Lutheran Church (RLC).  Based on these circumstances, the Board considered 
erasure from the Register to be an adequate sanction.  In doing so, the Board 
found that the sanction of suspension for at least one year that the Hearing 
Officer previously recommended was too lenient.  The Court of Appeals 
used the res judicata doctrine and the terms of the settlement agreement to 
ultimately affirm the decision of the County Court. 
Nevertheless, ordinary courts will still apply basic principles of law, 
especially in cases of manifest legal errors such as ultra vires claims.  In 
Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects,169 the Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, which in turn had 
agreed with the findings of the Court of Queen’s Bench.  The latter had 
quashed the disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Practice Review Board 
of the Alberta Association of Architects against a firm of architects.  In that 
case, according to the Architects Act, the Board was only allowed to report 
to the Council of the Alberta Association of Architects and make 
appropriate recommendations and not assume functions that are entrusted 
to the Complaint Review Committee of the Association. 
 
VI. Private Enforcement and Constitutional Matters  
  
When examining the constitutional dimension of private enforcement, 
one important area that is worth examining is the interaction between 
certain restrictions enclosed in professional codes of ethics, such as 
restrictions relating to communications and advertising on one side, and the 
protection of human rights on the other.  
In particular, professional advertising is considered an essential 
component of the freedom of commercial speech.  In Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona,170 the United States Supreme Court allowed attorney advertising 
for the first time by relying on the First Amendment.  More specifically, it 
condemned blanket bans on price advertising and fees charged by attorneys 
and rules preventing attorneys from using nondeceptive terminology to 
describe their fields of practice.  According to the Court, “such speech 
serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable 
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decisionmaking” from consumers.171  In that case, the Supreme Court found 
that the postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true 
professionalism to be severely strained.172  It went on to hold that “since the 
belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’ trade has become an anachronism, the 
historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled.”173  
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,174 the US Supreme Court 
clarified that,  
 
Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and 
does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted 
only in the service of a substantial governmental 
interest, and only through means that directly advance 
that interest.175 Since state regulation of commercial 
speech may extend only as far as the interest it serves, 
state rules that are designed to prevent the potential for 
deception and confusion may be no broader than 
reasonably necessary to prevent perceived evil.  
 
Therefore, restrictions relating to commercial speech that is not itself 
deceptive is to be narrowly crafted.  Having said this, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that states have a substantial margin for manoeuvre, as they have 
a substantial interest to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech 
that is false, deceptive, misleading, or which proposes an illegal 
transaction.176 Hence, state rules prohibiting in-person solicitation of clients 
by lawyers can be permissible under certain circumstances, as the states 
bear “a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of 
the licensed professions and notably lawyers who are essential to the 
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primary governmental function of administrating justice and have 
historically been ‘officers of the Courts.’”177  Even if lawyers are self-
employed businessmen who are interested in pursuing their self-interest, 
they are also expected to act as trusted agents of their clients and as 
assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes.178  
Thus, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,179 the Supreme Court found 
that face-to-face solicitation by a lawyer for profit is a practice rife with 
possibilities of overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue 
influence and outright fraud.  Whenever state rules and ethical standards of 
lawyers are linked to the service and protection of clients notably by 
protecting their privacy, they further the goals of true professionalism and 
thus are admissible.180  Such measures, including outright bans of in-person 
solicitation can be prophylactic ones, aiming to prevent harm before it 
occurs, and therefore, proof of actual harm is not required.  Such measures 
are necessary, because in-person solicitation is not visible or otherwise 
subject to effective oversight either by the state or the legal profession.  
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,181 the Supreme Court 
dealt with three more precise questions: prohibitions on soliciting legal 
business through advertisements containing advice and information 
regarding specific legal problems; restrictions on the use of illustrations in 
advertising by lawyers; and disclosure requirements relating to the terms of 
contingent fees.  Examining the three issues in turn, the Supreme Court 
found that lawyers’ newspaper advertisements containing truthful and non-
deceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential 
clients as well as accurate and nondeceptive illustrations are permissible. 
Thus, attorneys are allowed to go beyond passive advertising and use a 
more aggressive, but still truthful printed solicitation to attract clients. 
However, it found that, even if freedom of commercial speech invalidates 
any compulsion to speak, a State should be allowed to seek the maximum 
information to prevent deception of consumers.  Advertisers’ rights are 
protected as long as the disclosure requirements regarding the client’s 
liability for costs are reasonably related to the state objective. 
Later on, the Supreme Court relaxed its Ohralik jurisprudence.  
Thus, it ruled in Shapero that, contrary to in-person solicitation, 
targeted, direct-mail solicitation is protected by the First Amendment.  
Although the Court accepted that personalized targeted mailing poses 
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several risks, it found that a written solicitation is different from in-
person solicitation, and therefore a total ban against the former would 
be unnecessary, as a less restrictive alternative would be to simply 
require that the lawyers file any solicitation letter with a state agency, 
“giving the State ample opportunity to supervise mailings and penalize 
actual abuses.”182  In more recent cases, the Supreme Court accepted that:  
 
- specializations of lawyers can under certain circumstances 
be advertised;183 
- a 30-day ban on direct mail solicitation in accident or 
disaster cases to protect the privacy of potential recipients 
is permissible.184   
 
It remains open whether and how to regulate unverifiable claims made 
by lawyers in advertisements seeking to convey the quality of their legal 
services.  For instance, the New York Code of Professional Responsibility 
adopted in 2006 included rules prohibiting the use of nicknames, trade 
names, and marketing slogans that may imply an unproved ability to win 
cases.  In addition, the use of marketing gimmicks and other attention-
getting techniques not containing objective information about legal services 
was equally prohibited.  In Alexander v. Cahill, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit found in 2010 that such regulations do not 
materially advance the state’s interest in prohibiting the dissemination of 
misleading information.185  The United States Supreme Court denied hearing 
the case.  Few years earlier, nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court upheld 
restrictions prohibiting a law firm from using an image of a pit bull in its 
advertisements.186 
In In re R.M.J., the US Supreme Court condemned absolute prohibitions 
on certain types of potentially misleading advertisements:187 
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Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is 
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.  But 
when the particular content or method of the advertising 
suggests that it is inherently misleading or when 
experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject 
to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions.  
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.  But the 
States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types 
of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas 
of practice, if the information also may be presented in a 
way that is not deceptive. 
 
The Court also reaffirmed the notion that a state might require a 
warning or disclaimer to minimize the likelihood of consumer confusion or 
deception.188  However, disclaimers should not be unduly burdensome and 
thus rule out the ability of lawyers to employ short advertisements.  The US 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit argued as much in Public Citizen Inc. 
v. Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board.189  In that case, the Fifth Circuit 
also outlawed rules prohibiting lawyers from advertising previous litigation 
successes and testimonials and banning advertising that depicts a jury or a 
judge.  Thus, regulation of attorney advertising will continue to be a topical 
matter, as states attempt to cope with the emergence of new media and the 
limits of content that can be advertised by lawyers.  
In De Moor v. Belgium,190 the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECTHR) had to examine a complaint by a retired army officer whose 
application to be entered in the list of trainee advocates of the Hasselt was 
rejected by the Bar Council Mr. De Moor challenged the decision before 
the Conseil d’Etat Almost eight years later, the Conseil d’Etat decided 
to dismiss the appeal, considering that it lacked jurisdiction to review 
decisions of the Bar Council The Court underscored that once Mr. De 
Moor fulfilled the conditions for admission, his right of access to the Bar 
could not be hampered On the contrary, the disputed decision gave no 
reasons as to the objective conditions that the candidate failed to fulfill
The Court found that no public hearing was held to scrutinize the 
application and the decision was not delivered in public, thereby violating 
Mr. Moor’s right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of 
ECTHR. 
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VII. Private Enforcement and Competition Law  
 
Enforcing antitrust rules in professional services to harness abuse of 
monopoly power and cartel-like behavior by self-regulating professional 
bodies has been an important task of the judicial branch.  Close surveillance 
and control of the activities of largely self-regulating professional bodies is 
necessary, as the number of labor forces dependent on licensing procedures 
giving access to a given occupation grows.191  A peculiarity of law-related 
competition analysis regarding self-regulating bodies endowed with 
regulatory power by the state is that no per se (or as such) abuse is created by 
the mere fact of assigning exclusive rights or a dominant position in a given 
market.192  Indeed, as the US Supreme Court noted in Goldfarb, the public 
service aspect of certain professional services and other features of the 
professions at stake may call for a more nuanced approach.193 What is 
rather key in such an inquiry is whether an abuse of such rights took place 
that led to an unreasonable market distortion that cannot be outweighed by 
any procompetitive justification.194  For instance, the US Supreme Court 
found a prohibition to engage in fraudulent practices or untruthful and 
deceptive advertising reasonable.195 
Professional rules of private bodies that may have anti-competitive 
effects include rules relating to price fixing; recommended prices and 
minimum fees; restrictions relating to commercial communications and 
advertising; quantitative restrictions to the number of licenses emitted;196 
entry requirements and reserved rights; and regulations relating to legal 
form, ownership and multidisciplinary practices.197  In several instances, 
professional bodies worldwide have included these types of restrictions in 
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their codes of ethics and linked them to the proper conduct of the 
profession or even consumer protection.198 
In Goldfarb,199 the United States Supreme Court was called upon to 
examine the consistency of a minimum-fee schedule and its enforcement 
mechanism with the Sherman Act, as applied to fees for legal services 
performed by attorneys in examining titles in connection with financing the 
purchase of real estate.  Previously, the Court of Appeals expressed the 
traditional view at the time that occupational regulation increases quality 
and reduces information asymmetries without any negative spillovers.  
Thus, it found that the State Bar’s action was immune from liability as state 
action.  The practice of law does not constitute trade or commerce within 
the meaning of the Sherman Act, according to the Court of Appeals.  
The Supreme Court, however, found that the Virginia State Bar 
practice constituted price-fixing and thus violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
The schedule was a rigid price floor enforced through the threat of 
professional discipline by the State Bar, and by tacitly ensuring that other 
lawyers would not compete by underbidding.  It created a price system 
that consumers were bound to use, as title examination is a necessary step 
in financing a real estate purchase.  The Supreme Court went on to 
examine the alleged immunity of the ‘learned professions’ under the 
Sherman Act. The Court took issue with the Court of Appeals and 
reminded that the nature of an occupation, standing alone, cannot exclude 
the application of the Sherman Act, especially when one considers its 
comprehensive language, whereas the public-service aspect of 
professional practice is not controlling in determining whether § 1 of the 
Sherman Act includes professions.200  The Court observed:201 
 
the examination of a land title is a service; the exchange 
of such a service for money is “commerce” in the most 
common usage of that word. It is no disparagement of the 
practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has 
this business aspect. . . (Footnote omitted). 
 
 198. Commission Decision of 24 June 2004 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty concerning case COMP/A.38549 – Belgian Architects’ Association (June 24, 2004). 
 199. Lewis Goldfarb , 421 U.S. 773, 773. 
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Estate Boards, 339 US at 485, 489 (1950). 
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certain circumstances, in view of the public interest aspect and the features of certain professions, 
it may be possible that certain restraints, which would otherwise be considered as violating the 
Sherman Act, would be treated differenty. Id. at 789. 
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The Supreme Court went on to add:202  
 
In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities 
of lawyers play an important part in commercial 
intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers 
may exert a restraint on commerce. 
 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that professional 
licensing activities affect interstate commerce and cannot escape the 
application of antitrust rules under the Sherman Act.  A few years later, the 
United States Supreme Court had to decide on the compatibility of the 
Sherman Act with a rule of ethics adopted by the NSPE prohibiting its 
members from submitting competitive bids for engineering services.203  
Thus, engineers were guided to refuse to negotiate or even discuss the 
question of fees until the client has selected the engineer for a particular 
project.  The Supreme Court held that the rule at stake amounted to collusion 
among competitors who refused to discuss prices with potential clients until 
negotiations result in the initial selection of an engineer.  This practice operates 
as an absolute ban on competitive bidding.  
The Court ruled that unfettered competition was essential to the health 
of a free market economy and the only lawful way competition could be 
restrained was through state or federal legislation.  Having said this, ethical 
norms in professional services may serve to regulate and promote competition 
in such services.  In its judgment, the Court dismissed arguments stressing the 
possible negative effects of fee competition on the health, safety, and welfare 
of the public.  The Court also emphasized that enforcement of antitrust rules 
does not impinge on the First Amendment.204 
Similarly, the United States Justice Department in the same period of 
time determined that the Sherman Act of 1890 demanded that architects be 
allowed to compete on the basis of fees and that not doing so constituted an 
unreasonable trade restriction.  
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, the 
United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a decision 
by the professional selfregulating body to exclude nondentists from the 
market for teeth whitening services in North Carolina can be subject to the 
Sherman Act.  The Court first recalled that certain activities of states in 
 
 202. Id. at 788. 
 203. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978). 
 204. Id. at 697, citing to Giboney v Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 US 490, 502 (1949). 
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their sovereign capacity which are anticompetitive can escape the purview 
of the Sherman Act.  For this, the challenged anticompetitive restraint must 
be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and such 
policy must be actively supervised by the state.205  According to the Court, 
active supervision means that the state has review mechanisms in place that 
offer a realistic assurance that the private regulator promotes state policy 
when acting in a noncompetitive manner.  This would mean that the state 
should be able to review the substance of the anticompetitive decision and 
if needed, veto or modify that decision to ensure its alignment with state 
policy.  In addition, to ensure impartiality and objectivity, the State cannot 
itself be an active market participant in that same market.  
In the case at hand, the Supreme Court found that, absent any active 
supervision by the state (which in most professional associations is 
missing), the Board cannot invoke state-action antitrust immunity as 
established in Parker v. Brown206 if a controlling number of the Board’s 
decision-makers are in fact active market participants in the same 
profession that the Board regulates.207  Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted 
narrowly the concept of the “exercise of the State’s sovereign power” and 
confirmed that private regulators lack immunity for anticompetitive 
behaviour unless the State accepts political accountability for such behavior 
that permits and controls.208  This is so even if such bodies exercise public 
functions.209  Implicitly, the Supreme Court also re-opened the discussion 
regarding job allocation in the case of overlapping scope of practice for 
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possibly competing professions.210 
As noted earlier, anticompetitive behavior may be part and parcel of a 
professional code of ethics.  Just like the US Supreme Court’s, settled 
CJEU case law suggest that rules of professional ethics come within the 
scope of EU competition law, as they organize and influence the exercise 
of a given profession.211  The compatibility of rules contained in CoC with 
EU law may be contentious when examined through the lens of 
competition law.  Such an examination is, however, necessary to ensure 
that equally competitive conditions are offered to the economic operators 
active in the EU market, and that rules enshrined in codes of professional 
conduct do not impose anti-competitive behaviour.212 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the CJEU adopted a sweeping view as to 
the applicability of competition rules to professional services.  In Wouters, the 
CJEU held that lawyers are undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 
TFEU.213 The Court justified this finding by noting that they offer services 
against remuneration and bear the financial risks that failures may entail.214  By 
the same token, the Bar should be regarded as an association of undertakings that 
adopts a collusive behaviour in contravention of Article 101 in that it influences 
the conduct of its members on the market in the relevant services sector and 
directs them to act in a particular manner when they carry their economic 
activity.215  These findings apply to every professional association and its 
members, as long as they have some regulatory powers.216  Thus, rules created in 
the exercise of a professional body’s regulatory autonomy and discretion, such as 
the adoption of codes of professional conduct (or of certain rules therein, such as 
those relating to advertising or minimum/maximum fees), are decisions adopted 
by an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101:1 TFEU.217  
The CJEU also ruled that a violation of Articles 10 and 81 EC (now 4:3 on 
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the Treaty on European Union-TEU218 and 101 TFEU, respectively) occurs 
when (a) a MS divests its rules of legislative character through delegation to 
private economic actors of the responsibility to take decisions affecting the 
economic sphere, or (b) a MS requires or even encourages collusive behaviour 
contrary to Article 101 or reinforces its effects.219  Under this latter option, the 
behaviour of all self-regulatory bodies can be examined against the EU 
competition rules.  Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the activity of 
professional associations can also constitute an abuse of dominant position.220 
In Mauri,221 the issue was whether a violation of EU competition rules 
occurs in case when access to the legal profession is determined by a state 
examination committee, which consists of five members and two of them – or 
potentially three – are already members of the Bar.  The CJEU found that this is 
outweighed by the presence of two judges who must be regarded as an 
emanation of that state.  Other outweighing factors also are that the Ministry of 
Justice can potentially intervene at every state of the process, whereas negative 
decisions can be appealed before the administrative court, which will conduct a 
de novo review.  Thus, sufficient state involvement coalesced to the 
inapplicability of competition rules.  
The result in Mauri was in line with the CJEU’s finding in Wouters that 
rules adopted by a professional association are, for all practical purposes, state 
measures.  Therefore, they fall outside the scope of the EU competition rules 
when an EU MS grants regulatory powers to that professional association.  This 
is so even if the state defines the public interest criteria and the essential 
principles with which the rules of the professional associaton must comply and 
retains its power to adopt decisions in the last resort.222  In addition, the Court 
clarified that the fact that a given activity by the professional body does not aim 
to make a profit cannot alone prevent the application of Article 101 TFEU where 
the offer of services by this body coexists in competition with that of other, for-
profit operators.223 
In Wouters, the CJEU also found that outright prohibitions of 
multidisciplinary practices in the legal profession enclosed in legislative acts or 
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codes of conduct violate Article 101:1(b).  This is because they are liable to limit 
production and technical development,224 as they do not allow the exploitation of 
the one-stop-shop advantage, the supply of ‘full service’ and the possible 
diminution of costs.  However, the CJEU submitted that the rules at issue were 
designed to ensure the proper conduct of the profession and the sound 
administration of justice.  Therefore, they were justified and proportionate, 
thereby striking a balance between the anti-competitive behaviour and the 
pursuit of non-economic legitimate objectives, which may, however, have pro-
competitive effects.225 
Enforcement of competition rules is achieved through the judicial route but 
also through the DG Competition of the European Commission. For instance, in 
2004, the Commission struck down the recommended fee scale operated by the 
Belgian Architects’ Association.226  Although the scale was described as a 
guideline with which not all architects had complied, the Commission found that 
the fee scale was an independent act of prescriptive character for which the 
Association, acting as an association of undertakings according to Article 101 
TFEU, was wholly responsible. 
Regional competition authorities also attempt to strike down anti-
competitive practices of professionals.  For instance, the Finnish 
Competition Authority challenged the practice of the Association of 
Finnish Architects (SAFA) that prevented its members from entering 
architectural competitions only after consulting with or receiving 
approval by SAFA.  According to the Finnish Competition Authority, this 
behaviour constitutes an impermissible output limitation.227  
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Pro-competition provisions that lead to better access to professions in 
certain markets can also be part of legislative instruments aiming at the 
liberalization of the service sector in general.  For instance, in the EU, a 
long-lasting discussion as to the anti-competitive effects of total bans on 
advertising culminated to the adoption of a provision in the EU Services 
Directive outlawing total bans on commercial communications.  This per se 
prohibition has been applied strictly by the CJEU in a recent case regarding 
a total prohibition of canvassing in the profession of qualified accountant in 
France.228  After defining ‘canvassing’ as an unsolicited personal offer of 
goods or services to a certain natural or legal person, the Court found that 
the concept of commercial communication set out in Article 24:1 of the 
Services Directive is sufficiently broad to cover canvassing that is yet 
another form of direct marketing.  Therefore, a total prohibition of this 
form of commercial communication is inconsistent with the EU Services 
Directive and cannot be justified based on a legitimate public interest nor is 
it proportionate to the objective it wants to achieve.  Crucially, the CJEU 
took a pro-liberalization/pro-competition stance adhering to the view that 
such prohibitions of advertising deprive EU service suppliers of an effective 
means of penetrating a given EU market.229  Arguably, the most interesting 
element of this judgment by the CJEU is the fact that the Court dismissed in 
two sentences the possibility for justifying such a restriction, alluding to the 
narrow test that it is willing to apply in similar cases in the future.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
  
The objective of this article has been to map rules, instances, and 
institutions of enforcement in transnational private regulation regimes. 
Such regimes shape the new landscape for global practice of various 
professions; they keep the tradition of domestic self-regulation in the 
shadow of the law and the State but dramatically expand its territorial 
scope through the globalization of guidelines, recommendations and codes 
of conduct and ethics.  At the same time, self-contained disciplinary 
regimes for global professionals are virtually non-existent.  Rather, the 
creation of disciplinary rules in international professional associations is 
left for the future.  Nevertheless, the future will soon become the present, 
as over half of global exports in services are in the business services sector. 
To date, there are noteworthy variations in private, non-judicial 
disciplinary proceedings, which are fairly interesting when ordinary 
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judicial proceedings are also involved, typically at the appeal stage.  In the 
latter case, fair trial considerations and clemency when judged by a 
professional body are more often than not reasons for striking down or 
amending rulings made by the disciplinary bodies of professional 
associations.  Participation of state representatives and/or non-professionals 
can under certain circumstances, ensure independence and impartiality, as 
well as satisfy due process.  
Having said this, the turn to informality230 at the global level seems to 
be irreversible and permeates virtually all types of economic activity.  Our 
analysis, while explorative, demonstrates that the State (in its various 
forms) endows professional associations with self-regulatory authority, but is 
still omnipresent in the regulation of professional services.231  In addition, 
professional associations may be regarded as decentralized state agencies, as 
American courts found for the State Bars.  However, principal-agent issues 
will most likely arise, as amply demonstrated by the case law discussed above. 
Private enforcement is essential when technical expertise is needed to 
adequately decide on a complaint against a given professional.  On the 
other hand, private disciplinary bodies (other than in the legal profession) 
may lack legal expertise.  In that case, it is quintessential to have envisaged 
a disciplinary system that is open to an appeal in ordinary courts or else 
ensure that essential due process rights and the rule of law find expression 
in the statutes, rules, and by-laws of the professional association at stake.   
Self-regulation has been regarded as an excellent way for the State to 
remedy information asymmetries and diminish monitoring and enforcement 
costs.  Enforcement before private bodies that are composed in accordance 
with the statutes of a professional association or its code of professional 
conduct can indeed be more expedient and somehow alleviate the workload 
of courts.  In this sense, private non-judicial enforcement and public 
judicial mechanisms are functionally mutually reinforcing.232  However, 
allegations against the impartiality, objectivity and proper constitution of 
their disciplinary mechanisms undermine any sincere efforts by 
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professional bodies to take full advantage of the opportunities that self-
regulation provides.  Governmental authorities and public courts may be 
called upon to scrutinize complaints about anticompetitive practices, 
market foreclosure, excessive prices, and monopolies, and to balance 
between incommensurables.  However, the more powerful transnational 
private regimes as meta-regulators become, the more official judicial 
mechanisms will see the need for more transnational cooperation and 
perhaps collective review of claims.233 
Transnational professional associations have to intensify their work on 
levelling the playing field with regard to canons of ethics for a given 
profession.  This includes, inter alia, increasing the level of transparency 
internally.  Possibilities for drawing inspiration from the legal and judicial 
systems around the world abound.  As mobility of professionals increases 
in a globalized business environment, demands for more streamlined rules 
will be emerging more often, leading to more concerted efforts for mutual 
recognition or equivalence. 
In addition, new technologies should be expected to further transform 
the way professional expertise is sought, found, supplied and diffused.234 
Technological advances will render necessary a reconceptualization of all 
issues relating to professions, from the initiation of mandates to the 
conundrum of efficient remedies.  This will lead to disruptive innovations that 
will transform extant market structures in all backbone professions, including 
the three analyzed in this article.235  To avoid the danger of becoming 
irrelevant soon, professional associations should intensify their work at the 
national and transnational level to factor in these important developments and 
use them to positively modernize the supply of professional services.  
Researchers will have to critically review such transformations at regular 
intervals with a view to ensuring that economic opportunities are distributed 
evenly and in a pro-competitive manner.  At the more abstract level, future 
research will need to more closely assess the extent transnationalism affects the 
future and fate of self-regulation in professional services. 
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